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I. INTRODUCTION
In Commonwealth v. Woodward,' the highly publicized murder trial of
an au pair accused of killing an infant in her care, the defense team faced
a strategic decision commonly encountered at trial: whether to request
or. to object to lesser included jury instructions. Put simply, the
Woodward defense team had to decide whether to ask for an instruction
that would permit the jury to return a manslaughter verdict, or to object
to such an instruction, leaving the jury only the choice either to acquit the
defendant or to convict her of second degree murder as charged in the
indictment.2 Undoubtedly concerned that the jury might return a
* Professor and Director of Clinical Legal Education, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
** Assistant Professor and Director, Program in Criminal Justice and Corrections, Department
of Sociology, Mississippi State University. We would like to thank Koni Johnson, Heiko Burrow
and Lori Ketner for their assistance in the preparation of this Article. We also would like to thank
Professor Leo Whinery and the Empirical Research in Law Committee of the University of Oklahoma
College of Law for the funding that made this study possible. Finally, we would like to thank the
many public defenders and administrators who participated in the study.
1. No. CRIM. 97-0433, 1997 WL 694119 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 10, 1997), affd, 694 N.E.2d
1277 (Mass. 1998).
2. See id. at *6. Under Massachusetts law, a defendant's desire to adopt an all-or-nothing
strategy, however, does not bind the trial judge to accept that strategic choice. See id. A trial judge
does not err if he or she fails to instruct the jury on a lesser included instruction and allows a
defendant to pursue an all-or-nothing trial strategy. See Commonwealth v. Roberts, 555 N.E.2d 588,
592 (Mass. 1990). On the other hand, a trial judge is entitled to instruct on a lesser included
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manslaughter verdict, either as a compromise or because it comported
with the evidence, but apparently confident that the jury would acquit
rather than return a murder verdict, the defense team chose to object to
the submission of the manslaughter instruction This strategic deci-
sion-based on the defense team's prediction of what the jury was likely
to do when faced with an all-or-nothing choice--was personally and
publicly approved by Ms. Woodward.4 Unfortunately for Ms. Woodward,
the jury returned a guilty verdict.5 Fortunately for her, however, the trial
judge invoked the court's statutory authority and reduced the verdict to
the lesser included charge of manslaughter.6 Declaring that a court "is
not a casino," the judge voided a result he deemed "a miscarriage of
justice."7
Lost amid the clamor of reaction to the Woodward verdict and the trial
court's controversial decision is the fact that countless criminal defendants
and defense lawyers struggle daily making a host of strategic choices both
before and during trial based largely on defense counsel's assessment of
the risk involved and of the potential costs and benefits of taking
particular action.' Unquestionably, some criminal defendants benefit and
others suffer when risky strategic decisions are made. Few defendants,
however, are rescued as dramatically as Ms. Woodward when their
decisions-or gambles-turn out badly. Rather, defendants usually must
instruction over the defendant's objection if the evidence warrants the submission of a lesser included
instruction, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Matos, 634 N.E.2d 138, 142 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994), and may
even be required to do so, see Commonwealth v. Thayer, 634 N.E.2d 576, 578 (Mass. 1994).
In some jurisdictions, the trial judge is obligated to respect the defendant's choice to adopt an all-
or-nothing strategy. See, e.g., People v. Garcia, 686 N.E.2d 700, 703 (III. App. Ct. 1997), appeal
allowed, 690 N.E.2d 1384 (Ill. 1998); State v. Boeglin, 731 P.2d 943, 945-46 (N.M. 1987). As in
Massachusetts, however, many other jurisdictions give the trial judge the authority to override the
defendant's strategic choice and to submit lesser included instructions to the jury, despite the
defendant's objection, if the judge deems that the evidence supports such a verdict. See, e.g., People
v. Barton, 906 P.2d 531, 536 (Cal. 1995).
3. See Woodward, 1997 WL 694119, at *6.
4. See id. at *7. Prior to instructing the jury, Judge Hiller Zobel addressed Ms. Woodward
personally to ensure that she understood the consequences if her strategy backfired. See Bill
Hutchinson & Andrea Estes, Nanny Gambles Jury Will Set Her Free, Boston HERALD, Oct. 28, 1997,
at I, available in 1997 WL 5414995.
5. See Woodward, 1997 WL 694119, at *8.
6. See id.
7. Id. at *7. Judge Zobel's decision to reduce the verdict was upheld on appeal. See
Woodward, 694 N.E.2d 1277, 1298 (Mass. 1998).
8. Indeed, most criminal defendants accept plea bargains and do not even choose to go to trial
* largely because of counsel's prediction of the defendant's limited chances at trial or the likelihood
of a harsher sentence after such a trial. See Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as
Effective Negotiator: A Systemic Approach, 2 CLINICAL L. REv. 73, 81-86 (1995) [hereinafter
Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer].
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bear the consequences of strategic decisions that backfire even though
they have had little or no say in the decisions.9
The Woodward defense team clearly involved the defendant in the
decision to object to the lesser included jury instruction.'0 But what if the
defense team had made the decision regarding the lesser included
instruction without consulting Ms. Woodward? Or what if Ms. Wood-
ward had wanted to minimize the risk of a possible life sentence and had
insisted on having the lesser included instruction submitted to the jury?
Would the defense team have deferred to her choice and abandoned the
all-or-nothing strategy even though they believed her choice to be
strategically unsound?"
The Woodward case, and even more vividly, the Theodore Kaczynski
case,' 2 highlights the difficulties lawyers encounter in resolving questions
of the proper division of decisionmaking power or responsibility between
9. The Fifth Circuit has observed: "Criminal defendants daily entrust their liberty to the skill
of their lawyers. The consequences of the lawyer's decisions fall squarely upon the defendant.
There is nothing untoward in this circumstance. To the contrary, the lawyer as the defendant's
representative is at the core of our adversary process." Jones v. Estelle, 722 F.2d 159, 165 (5th Cir.
1983); see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93-94 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
(discussing reasons defendants are bound by counsel's strategic decisions even though made without
consultation).
For a sampling of the many cases in which clients are bound by strategic choices made without
their input or contrary to the client's wishes, see infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
Unquestionably, defendants who personally make an informed choice to gamble on a lesser included
instruction as Ms. Woodward did will be bound by that choice. See, e.g., People v. Bunyard, 756
P.2d 795, 825-26 (Cal. 1988) (holding that defendant cannot complain of trial judge's failure to give
lesser included instruction because defendant and counsel made a deliberate choice to utilize an all-
or-nothing strategy); State v. Boeglin, 731 P.2d 943, 947 (N.M. 1987) ("Mhe defendant in a first
degree murder prosecution may take his chances with the jury by waiving instructions on lesser
included offenses and cannot be heard to complain on appeal if he has gambled and lost."); Pcople
v. Petrovich, 664 N.E.2d 503, 503-04 (N.Y. 1996) (holding that when client and counsel disagree
about the decision whether to request lesser included instruction, the choice ultimately is for the client
who will be bound by that decision even if it turns out badly).
10. See Woodward, 1997 WL 694119, at *7.
11. No Massachusetts appellate court explicitly has addressed the question of whether the
decision regarding the submission of lesser included instructions is ultimately the choice of defense
counsel or the defendant. It is unclear, therefore, what the Woodward defense team would have done
had Ms. Woodward demanded the submission of a lesser included instruction.
12. United States v. Kaczynski, CR-S-96-259GEB GGH, 1997 WL 716487 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 7,
1997). Kaczynski's criminal case drew national attention not only because, as the "Unabomber," he
had been the focus of one of the most intense manhunts in American history, but also because his
running battle with his court-appointed lawyers over defense strategy delayed the-trial and ultimately
led to a negotiated plea. See Daniel Klaidman & Patrick King, Suicide Mission: Trial of Accused
Unabomber Ted Kaczynski, NEWsWEEK, Jan. 19, 1998, at 22, available in 1998 WL 9578052.
Kaczynski's highly publicized struggle with his lawyers over strategy generated considerable debate
about the defendant's right to control trial decisions, especially when the defendant's mental state is
suspect. See infra note 13.
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counsel and client. Moreover, as the diverse reaction to these cases
evinces, the legal profession is sharply divided as to how decisionmaking
power should be allocated. 3 Legal scholars vigorously disagree about the
appropriate role for the lawyer in wielding decisionmaking power in the
attorney-client relationship, a disagreement that has spawned a host of
articles and books. 4 Similarly, reported decisions reflect significant
judicial disagreement about the extent to which clients should be involved
in making decisions about their cases."5
Given the mixed guidance provided by legal commentators, case law,
and professional standards regarding the proper division of
decisionmaking responsibility, lawyers are relatively free to decide for
themselves whether they will share decisionmaking power with their
clients.'6 The question becomes, then, to what extent do practicing
lawyers actually involve their clients in decisionmaking as the lawyers did
13. See, e.g., Editorial, What Competence Must Mean, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 1998, at A20,
available in 1998 WL 2463024 (discussing legal experts' disagreement over how much control
Kaczynski should have over his own defense); Michael Mello, Unabom Defense Should Assist and
Not Resist, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 26, 1998, at A21 (arguing that Kaczynski's lawyers were wrong in
denying him the right to choose his own defense); Victoria Slind-Flor, Unabomber Case Begins: The
Focus is Mental State, Diaries of Accused, But Some Talk of a Plea, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 24, 1997, at
Al (discussing conflicting views of role of attorney when a client like Kaczynski wants to control
the defense).
14. See generally, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988);
DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE (1974); Robert D. Dinerstein,
Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1990); Stephen
EIImann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717 (1987); David Luban, Paternalism and the
Legal Profession, 1981 WiS. L. REV. 454; John K. Morris, Power and Responsibility Among Lawyers
and Clients: Comment on Ellmann's Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 781 (1987); Stephen
L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of
Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545 (1995); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988); Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client
Relationship: The Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315 (1987).
15. Compare Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93-94 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
(stating the traditional view of the lawyer's role is that trial decisions are necessarily entrusted to
defense counsel, who has "immediate and ultimate responsibility" to make "myriad tactical decisions"
even without consulting the defendant), with Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1983) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (advocating the more client-centered approach). This Article, however, will not join
in the ongoing debate of how decisionmaking power ought to be allocated within the attorney-client
relationship. Rather, this Article primarily focuses on the extent to which criminal defendants
actually are involved in decisionmaking when practicing lawyers and their clients face important
strategic and tactical decisions.
16. Numerous commentators have pointed out the lack of clear guidance provided by case law
and professional norms on the proper allocation of decisionmaking power between lawyer and client.
See, e.g., Vivian 0. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths-A
Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 33-46 (1986); Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives:
Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485, 503-11 (1994); Mark Spiegel,
Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L.
REV. 41, 49-72 (1979).
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in the Woodward case?'7 Do lawyers secure their clients' consent before
making strategic and tactical decisions, and if not, why not? If the
defendant is unwilling to consent, are lawyers willing to respect the
strategic choices of a client even though they disagree with the client's
choice? In light of the importance of such questions, it is surprising that
there is a paucity of empirical evidence indicating whether clients are
making strategic and tactical decisions in their cases.'" We decided,
therefore, to design a research project aimed at collecting data on lawyer-
client decisionmaking. This Article reports the findings of our study.
The Article begins by briefly discussing the conflicting views of the
proper allocation of decisionmaking responsibility within the lawyer-client
relationship. Part II describes the two major approaches or models of
lawyering: the traditional, lawyer-centered model and the participatory,
client-centered approach. Part III then looks at the limited extent to
which the legal profession's ethical rules provide guidance regarding the
proper allocation of decisionmaking authority between lawyer and client.
Turning next to the specific relationship between lawyer and criminal
defendant, Part IV examines how the Constitution and professional norms
encourage, but do not mandate, lawyer dominance over most
decisionmaking issues.' 9 In view of the broad discretion granted criminal
defense lawyers to determine to what degree they actually involve their
clients in strategic and tactical decisions, many commentators assume that
most lawyers are unwilling to share decisionmaking power, but rather
17. Citing a small survey of divorce lawyers presented in HUBERT J. O'GORMAN, LAWYERS
AND MATRIMONIAL CASES 163-64 (1963), William Simon claims that what he terms the autonomy
and paternalist views of lawyering are both "well represented among practitioners." William H.
Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 MD. L. REv. 213 n.1 (1991)
[hereinafter Mrs. Jones's Case]. Given the dearth of empirical evidence on lawyer-client
decisionmaking, see infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text, it is difficult to say just how divided
practitioners really are.
18. A number of scholars have noted the surprisingly small number of studies yielding data on
client involvement in decisionmaking. See, e.g., Dinerstein, supra note 14, at 577 n.342; Miller,
supra note 16, at 509-10. Surely the most important work in this area is Douglas Rosenthal's study
of personal injury lawyers in New York and their interactions with their clients. See generally
ROSENTHAL, supra note 14. There is, however, virtually no empirical evidence from which one can
draw any meaningful generalizations about the extent to which clients are actively involved in
strategic and tactical decisions in criminal cases. See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
19. Certain decisions, however, are consistently recognized as ultimately reserved for the client,
including whether to'plead guilty, whether to accept a plea agreement, whether to waive a jury trial,
whether to testify, and whether to appeal. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 751 (citing Wainwright, 433 U.S.
at 93 n.1); MODEL' RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983); STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-5.2 (3d ed. 1993).
1998]
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"aim for total control of the representation."2 But is this really so? Do
most lawyers, in fact, dominate strategic and tactical decisionmaking in
criminal cases?
To answer this question, we conducted an exploratory study of five
public defender offices involving almost seven hundred public defend-
ers." Section V presents the methodology we employed in that study and
then analyzes the data collected. We found that a majority of the lawyers
studied adopt a more lawyer-centered approach to decisionmaking.
Nevertheless, we also found a significant number of public defenders who
exhibit a more client-centered orientation, which allows their clients to
make numerous strategic and tactical decisions. Finally, the Article
concludes by exploring some of the personal and systemic factors that
may affect the allocation of decisionmaking power between defendant and
public defender. Part VI probes some of the factors that influence the
lawyers in our study to take a client-centered approach and identifies
additional avenues of research.
20. Berger, supra note 16, at 34; see also Miller, supra note 16, at 509-10. A paternalistic
lawyer may want total control over decisionmaking and still be motivated to represent his or her
clients zealously. Some lawyers with a paternalist view provide excellent representation.
Unfortunately, some lawyers use their decisionmaking power to serve their own interests, not those
of their clients. There are a number of unflattering articles depicting criminal defense law-
yers-especially public defenders and appointed lawyers-as manipulative double agents primarily
focused on arm-twisting defendants into pleading guilty, not on providing zealous representation.
See generally Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game: Organizational
Cooptation of a Profession, L. & SOC'y REV., June 1967, at 15; Jerome H. Skolnick, Social Control
in the Adversary System, II J. CONFLICT RESOL. 52 (1967).
Unquestionably, there are unethical defense lawyers who choose not to share decisionmaking
power, except in a manipulative, disingenuous manner. So also, there are well-meaning but horribly
overworked and under-resourced defense lawyers, who lack either the time or the inclination to
involve their clients in decisionmaking. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role
in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1179-1210 (1975); Berger, supra note 16, at 60-64; Stephen
J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense: Promoting Effective Representa-
tion Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of Choice for All Criminal Defendants, 31 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 73, 85-96 (1993). Nonetheless, our observations and anecdotal evidence suggest that
many criminal defense lawyers strive to render competent representation whatever their
decisionmaking orientation. For a more detailed defense of this position, see Rodney J. Uphoff, The
Criminal Defense Lawyer: Zealous Advocate, Double Agent, or Beleaguered Dealer?, 28 CRIM. L.
BULL. 419 (1992) [hereinafter Uphoff, Zealous Advocate].
21. We recognize that this is an exploratory study because more data and more testing is needed
to determifie the validity of our initial findings. Nonetheless, we are confident that our study is
sufficiently large and varied that our findings reliably reflect the general attitudes and behavior of
public defenders regarding attomey-client decisionmaking.
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II. DIFFERING APPROACHES: LAWYER-CENTERED VERSUS CLIENT-
CENTERED DECISIONMAKING
According to the traditional view of the lawyer-client relationship, the
client chooses the goals or the objectives of the representation while the
lawyer selects the means to achieve the client's stated ends.22 Once the
client has retained counsel and identified the problem, the client's role is
largely passive. The lawyer, as a trusted and skilled professional, is to
utilize her training and specialized knowledge to manage the legal
problem or case in accordance with her best judgment. Thus, the lawyer
makes all tactical and strategic decisions, including the decision whether
to request a lesser included instruction, because the lawyer as a detached
expert is in a better position to do so than is the untrained, emotionally
involved client, and because the nature of the trial process simply does
not permit consultation, much less informed, client decisionmaking."3 By
choosing to retain the lawyer, or by accepting appointed counsel, the
client has expressly consented to allowing counsel to use her best
judgment in handling the client's legal matter.2  This approach to
decisionmaking, therefore, is lawyer-centered because it maximizes
lawyer autonomy by providing counsel the discretion to make the
22. See, e.g., Jones, 463 U.S. at 750-54; Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93-94 (1977)
(Burger, C.J., concurring). The traditional view, as articulated by Justice Burger in decisions such
as Wainwright and Jones, assumes clients should be passive and delegate almost all decisionmaking
power and responsibility to the lawyer, the expert, skilled professional. See Dinerstein, supra note
14, at 506. Although commentators use slightly different terms to describe the lawyer's role in the
traditional approach to the lawyer-client relationship, generally the lawyer/manager is depicted as the
master and the subservient, needful client is portrayed as the servant. See, e.g., Berger, supra note
16, at 33-37. For a more detailed look at the traditional approach, see DAVID A. BINDER ET AL.,
LAWYERS AS COuNsELORs: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 16-18 (1991); ROSENTHAL, supra note
14.
23. See Wainwright, 433 U.S. at93-94 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (placing ultimate responsibility
for strategic and tactical decisions with the lawyer, without need for consultation, in part, because
of the nature of the trial process). Anecdotal evidence suggests that a significant number of lawyers
share the view of former ABA president Chesterfield Smith that the lawyer as professional must take
charge of the case and make all strategic decisions: "Clients before long get great confidence in me
and they don't want me to tell them all of the alternatives. They want me to tell them what to do.
I do it and charge them." Panel Discussion, A Gathering of Legal Scholars to Discuss "Professional
Responsibility and the Model'Rules of Professional Conduct, "35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 639, 643 (1981).
For a sampling of others espousing the traditional lawyer-dominated approach, see, for example, F.
LEE BAILEY & HENRY B. ROTHBLATr, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL ADVOCACY § 58 (1974); Abe
Fortas, Thurman Arnold and the Theatre of Law, 79 YALE L.J. 988, 996 (1970); Samuel C. Stretton,
Trial Tactics and Strategy-Who Controls It, the Attorney or the Client?, THE CHAMPION, May 1992,
at 25, 25-26.
24. See, e.g., People v. Hamilton, 774 P.2d 730, 741 (Cal. 1989) (in bank) ("By choosing
professional representation, the accused surrenders all but a handful of 'fundamental' personal rights
to counsel's complete control of defense strategies and tactics."); see also BINDER ET AL., supra note
22, at 268; Spiegel, supra note 16, at 77.
1998]
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strategic decisions she deems necessary to attain the results she believes
are in the client's best interests.
The participatory or client-centered model,25 on the other hand, posits
a very different lawyer-client relationship. In this approach to lawyering,
counsel's role is to help the client identify his legal problems, to develop
solutions consistent with the client's goals, and to present the pros and
cons of each solution so that the client ultimately can select a course of
action that is consistent with the client's best interest."' The client-
centered lawyer is committed to a counseling process that requires the
client to take an active role both in establishing his priorities and
identifying his best interest as well as in making all fundamental
decisions that are likely to have a substantial legal or nonlegal impact on
the client or his case.17 The client-centered model serves to maximize
client autonomy by fostering client responsibility for decisionmaking. It
25. Although there are many variations of the client-centered model, those who espouse such
an approach are critical of the traditional lawyer-dominated view of the attorney-client relationship
and argue instead for a more balanced relationship in which lawyers interact with their clients in a
manner that fosters informed client decisionmaking. See, e.g., ROSENTHAL, supra note 14; Ellmann,
supra note 14; Miller, supra note 16; Morris, supra note 14; Spiegel, supra note 16; Strauss, supra
note 14. Undoubtedly, the model's most influentia proponents are David Binder and Susan Price,
whose first book, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977),
was the most widely used text on legal interviewing and counseling in legal education. Joined by
their colleague Paul Bergman, Binder and Price authored a revised text, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS:
A CLIENT CENTERED APPROACH, supra note 22, which continues to enjoy widespread use.
Nonetheless, many of those favoring a client-centered approach take issue with aspects of the Binder,
Bergman, and Price model. See, e.g., Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Legal Representation and the Next
Steps Toward Client Control: Attorney Malpractice for the Failure to Allow the Client to Control
Negotiation and Pursue Alternatives to Litigation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 819 (1990); Ellmann,
supra note 14; Alex J. Hurder, Negotiating the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Search for Equality
and Collaboration, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 71 (1996). For an excellent overview of the arguments for and
against the client-centered approach to legal' counseling and decisionmaking together with an
assessment of the strengths and limitations of the Binder and Price model, see generally Dinerstein,
supra note 14.
26. See BINDER ET AL., supra note 22, at 290-308, 316-46.
27. See id. at 268. According to Binder, Bergman, and Price, the client should make any
decision when the lawyer, using "such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of the
profession commonly possess and exercise," would or should know that such a decision is likely to
have a substantial legal or nonlegal impact on the client. Id.
The lawyer remains an active participant in the decisionmaking process advocated by Binder,
Bergman, and Price, but counsel is cautioned to withhold her advice or opinion regarding the client's
best course of action so as not to unduly influence or override her client's choices. See id. at 19-22.
A number of client-centered theorists have criticized this aspect of the initial Binder and Price
approach by arguing that denying advice to clients is manipulative and paternalistic, see Ellmann,
supra note 14, at 744-45, or that more flexibility regarding the circumstances when advice should
be proffered is warranted, see Dinerstein, supra note 14, at 509-10, 567-70. Under the traditional
view of lawyering, of course, counsel is free to use "reasonable persuasion to guide the client to a
sound decision." STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-5.1 commentary at 198 (3d ed.
1993).
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assumes not only that most clients are competent decisionmakers, but that
most are in a better position to make case decisions because so many
decisions ultimately turn on the values and priorities that the client alone
best appreciates."8 The lawyer's role in this model, then, is to provide
clients meaningful information so as to empower them to make informed
choices about their cases.29
A lawyer taking a client-centered approach still is called upon to utilize
her professional judgment to make many tactical and strategic decisions."
Commentators who espouse the client-centered model recognize that
lawyers must be provided the professional discretion to make deci-
sions-such as how to cross-examine a witness, what to include in a
closing argument, or whether to object to an improper question-without
the client's consent or even input." Time, common sense, and respect
for professional autonomy simply preclude the client from making all
strategic decisions. Nonetheless, the client-centered lawyer ultimately
28. See BINDER ET AL., supra note 22, at 5-10, 17-18; Miller, supra note 16, at 503-04. For
an article challenging this conception of the lawyer's role and arguing that good practice often
demands that lawyers make judgments about their clients' best interests and influence their clients
to adopt those judgments, see Mrs. Jones's Case, supra note 17.
29. The informed consent model advocated by some commentators, see, e.g., Spiegel, supra
note 16, envisions shared decisionmaking between lawyer and client. For a discussion of the
different goal sought by those espousing the Binder, Bergman, and Price approach, see Dinerstein,
supra note 14, at 507, 525-34.
30. See BINDER ET AL., supra note 22, at 270. Indeed, Binder, Bergman, and Price argue that
the lawyer as a professional must be given considerable freedom to perform her craft without client
interference:
[A] client's decision to hire you is tacit willingness for you to make lawyering skills
decisions free from consultation. Thus, such matters as how you cross examine, write
briefs, or phrase contingency clauses are generally for you alone to decide, even though
they may have a substantial impact. They involve primarily the exercise of the skills and
crafts that are the special domain of lawyers.
Id. Although this test or standard recognizes that client decisionmaking extends to strategic and
tactical issues, this "substantial impact" standard has been rightfully criticized as vague and as
offering little real guidance to lawyers trying to determine which decisions really belong to the client.
See, e.g., Hurder, supra note 25, at 77-80; Miller, supra note 16, at 511-14. Indeed, the standard
proposed by Binder, Bergman, and Price relegates virtually all strategic and tactical decisionmaking
to the lawyer, albeit with the need to consult with the client in many such decisions. See Miller,
supra note 16, at 511-12. Requiring only consultation, however, substantially reduces the force or
sweep of client-centered decisionmaking.
31. Client-centered theorists differ in the degree to which they advocate client involvement in
decisions that a traditionalist clearly would label as tactical and exclusively the lawyer's to make.
Compare BINDER ET AL., supra note 22, at 270-71 (arguing that lawyering skills decisions are the
special domain of lawyers but many such decisions warrant client consultation), with Spiegel, supra
note 16, at 123-26 (arguing that the client decides whether to call witness or cross-examine a
particular witness though the lawyer decides how to perform particular task such as the order of proof
and the details of eliciting testimony).
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gives her client the opportunity to make all significant case decisions.32
Thus, in the example of the defendant who, contrary to counsel's advice,
prefers the submission of a lesser included instruction rather than forcing
the jury into an all-or-nothing choice, the client-centered lawyer generally
would defer to the client's decision.33 The lawyer would do so, however,
only after ensuring that the client had carefully weighed and understood
the consequences of his choice and after attempting to persuade the client
to change his decision.34
This is not to say that all lawyers fall neatly into one camp or the other
or that all decisions can be easily pigeonholed into those that are solely
for the client and those that are exclusively the concern of counsel.35
Indeed, legal commentators, our own observations, and the findings of
our study indicate that lawyers who favor a client-centered approach do
not consistently consult with clients with respect to all significant case
decisions or uniformly provide all clients equal access to decisionmaking
power.36 Similarly, not all lawyers with a lawyer-centered approach
dictate all tactical and strategic decisions to the client or always refuse to
bow to the wishes of a client who the lawyer feels is insisting upon an
unsound strategic choice. Nevertheless, if, as our study suggests, lawyers
have a client-centered or lawyer-centered orientation, then that orientation
32. See BINDER ET AL., supra note 22, at 268.
33. See Spiegel, supra note 16, at 123-26. Although Binder, Bergman, and Price undoubtedly
would expect a lawyer to consult with the client regarding the decision to request a lesser included
instruction, they do not indicate that the lawyer should defer to the client's wishes on such a matter.
See BINDER ET AL., supra note 22, at 270-72. For many advocates of a client-centered approach,
however, respect for the client's choice in such a matter is an essential aspect of this approach to
lawyering. See, e.g., Spiegel, supra note 16, at 123-26. Nonetheless, client-centered theorists, for
the most part, have not addressed how clashes between lawyers and clients over strategic or factual
decisions should be resolved. For a more detailed critique of the extent to which most client-centered
literature fails to provide guidance on the allocation of specific decisionmaking power, see Miller,
supra note 16, at 504-14.
34. Good lawyering often requires persuading a client that making a particular decision or
taking certain action is, in fact, likely to be in the client's best interest when the client thinks
otherwise. The lawyer seeking to promote client decisionmaking, however, will strive to give advice
and to use "reasonable persuasion" without doing so in a manipulative fashion that compromises
client autonomy. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-5.1 commentary at 198 (3d ed.
1993) (describing the use of "reasonable persuasion"). For a look at the difficulty of the counseling
task facing the criminal defense lawyer, see, for example, Alschuler, supra note 20, at 1310; Abbe
Smith, Rosie O'Neill Goes to Law School: The Clinical Education of the Sensitive New Age Public
Defender, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 1-31 (1993); Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer, supra
note 8, at 83, 131-32.
35. See Hurder, supra note 25, at 76-80 (arguing that dividing decisions into those in the
client's domain and those in the lawyer's domain neither reflects actual practice nor is desirable, but
that the preferred approach involves open negotiation and joint decisionmaking).
36. See Dinerstein, supra note 14, at 567-70; see also infra Parts V.B. to VI. and accompanying
tables.
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reflects their view of the appropriate role of counsel in controlling case
decisions, a view that in turn is heavily influenced by the degree to which
the lawyer respects the value of client autonomy.37
III. THE ETHICAL RULES AND THE ALLOCATION OF DECISIONMAKING
POWER
The law student or lawyer seeking to determine to what extent a client
should be involved in particular strategic or tactical decisions will find
only limited guidance in the ethical rules of the legal profession.
Although commentators have drawn support from both the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility3" (Model Code) and the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct39 (Model Rules) to support a client-centered
approach,4° each also provides significant authority for the more
traditional model of the lawyer-client relationship.41 In the end, neither
the Model Code nor the Model Rules offers a definitive answer to the
proper allocation of decisionmaking power within that relationship or to
the specific question of who ultimately controls the decision to request a
lesser included jury instruction.
A. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility
Model Code Ethical Consideration (EC) 7-7 seemingly grants clients
broad decisionmaking power. It states:
In certain areas of legal representation not affecting the merits of the cause or
substantially prejudicing the rights of a client, a lawyer is entitled to make
decisions on his own. But otherwise the authority to make decisions is
37. In his compelling account of his own experiences as a public defender, Charles Ogletree
describes the values of empathy and heroism and the extent to which the clash of those values affects
the way public defenders view their professional role. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond
Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1239 (1993).
In Ogletree's view,
[t]he empathetic lawyer quite naturally embraces the client-centered approach to
representation, which "emphasiz[es] the importance of clients' expertise, thoughts and
feelings in resolving problems." She is likely to bring the client into decisionmaking and
to respect the client's decisions, even on strategic matters that have been traditionally
allocated to the lawyer. By contrast, the "heroic" public defender tends to accord a much
less central role to the client. Narrowly focused on the goal of winning the case, she is
likely to limit client autonomy and input to the minimum required by ethical rules, for
fear that the client will make the "wrong" decisions.
Id. at 1281 (quoting BINDER ET AL., supra note 22, at 18 (citation omitted)).
38. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980).
39. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1989).
40. See, e.g., Judith L. Maute, Allocation of Decisionmaking Authority Under the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, 17 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1049, 1056-57 (1984).
41. See Dinerstein, supra note 14, at 534-38; Miller, supra note 16, at 506-11.
HeinOnline  -- 47 U. Kan. L. Rev. 11 1998-1999
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
exclusively that of the client and, if made within the framework of the law, such
decisions are binding on his lawyer.42
If this language is construed expansively, almost any strategic or tactical
decision in a case could affect the merits of the case and, therefore, all
such decisions should belong to the client. Yet, the examples set out in
EC 7-7-accepting a settlement offer, waiving an affirmative defense,
pleading guilty, or taking an appeal43-are the types of significant
decisions generally considered to be reserved for the client, thus
suggesting that the language is not meant to be read too broadly.4"
Indeed, the Model Code contains other language demonstrating the
inconsistency of its guidance on the proper allocation of decisionmaking
responsibility. Model Code EC 7-26 states that a lawyer should "present
any admissible evidence his client desires to have presented unless he
knows, or from facts within his knowledge should know, that such
testimony or evidence is false, fraudulent, or perjured."'45 Read plainly,
EC 7-26 seemingly gives the client the right to insist upon calling certain
defense witnesses. No court, however, has looked to this provision as
authority for the proposition that a lawyer must defer to the client's
decision to call a witness even though counsel believes that the witness
will hurt the defense case or provide cumulative or irrelevant testimony.
In addition,, the fact that EC 7-26 does not even apply when the lawyer
wants to present admissible evidence by calling a witness contrary to her
client's wishes constitutes further evidence that the provision was never
intended to resolve the question of who has the final say in calling
witnesses.
Model Code EC 7-8 certainly lends support to the notion that the client
is the prime decisionmaker in the lawyer-client relationship by declaring
that "[iun the final analysis, however, the lawyer should always remember
that the decision whether to forego legally available objectives or
methods because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client and not
for himself. '46 Read in its entirety, EC 7-8 describes a decisionmaking
process in which .the lawyer has a duty to bring to the client's attention
a full range of information and to offer advice that includes moral and
non-legal considerations so that the client fully appreciates the signifi-
42. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1980).
43. See id.
44. See Dinerstein, supra note 14, at 534-35; Spiegel, supra note 16, at 65-67. Both Dinerstein
and Spiegel question a broad reading of EC 7-7. See Dinerstein, supra note 14, at 534-35 (stating
that the decisions EC 7-7 reserves for the client do not include decisions a client-centered lawyer
might consider the client's); Spiegel, supra note 16, at 65-67 (suggesting that the Model Code did
not intend that clients control every step taken in litigation).
45. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-26 (1980).
46. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1980).
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cance and consequences of his decision. Assume, for example, a client
does not want to call his elderly father as a witness-even though his
testimony is critical to the defense-because of the client's concern for his
father's physical and emotional well-being. EC 7-8 seemingly dictates
that, despite the lawyer's legitimate fear that the failure to call the father
will result in a guilty verdict, the decision regarding this "non-legal"
factor ultimately rests with the client. EC 7-8, however, describes a
process geared to the objectives or ends of the representation, not one
necessarily designed to cover all of the tactical or strategic decisions
involved in the litigation of a case. It is not clear, then, that EC 7-8
grants the client the final say when the lawyer and client disagree about
a legal factor, such as the utility of the father's testimony, that may affect
the client's case.
The Model Code's very next provision, EC 7-9, undercuts the
argument that EC 7-7 and EC 7-8 give clients ultimate decisionmaking
authority for all significant strategic and tactical decisions. EC 7-9 states:
"In the exercise of his professional judgment on those decisions which are
for his determination in the handling of a legal matter, a lawyer should
always act in a manner consistent with the best interests of his client. 4 7
Although this provision does not spell out in any detail which decisions
are within the lawyer's domain, EC 7-9 surely indicates that lawyers
retain significant decisionmaking authority beyond merely technical
matters.48
Finally, the only disciplinary rule (DR) that even speaks to the subject
of the allocation of decisionmaking further muddies the Model Code's
already murky waters. Model Code DR 7-101(B)(1) provides that a
lawyer may "[w]here permissible, exercise his professional judgment to
waive or fail to assert a right or position of his client." '49 This vague
grant of discretionary power is difficult to reconcile with a broad reading
of EC 7-7 and EC 7-8. Similarly, it is difficult to reconcile the discretion
provided by DR 7-101(B)(1) with DR 7-101(A)(1)'s command that a
lawyer "shall not intentionally... fail to seek the lawful objectives of his
client through reasonably available means permitted by law. 50 In the
end, the vague and conflicting provisions of the Model Code simply fail
to offer practitioners meaningful assistance regarding the proper division
of decisionmaking responsibility between lawyer and client.
47. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-9 (1980) (citation omitted).
48. See Spiegel, supra note 16, at 66.
49. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(B)(I) (1980).
50. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(I) (1980); see Dinerstein,
supra note 14, at 535 n.153; see also Maute, supra note 40, at 1056-57.
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B. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Unfortunately, the Model Rules are not a marked improvement. Model
Rule 1.2 sets up a dichotomy between objectives and means and states
that, except in limited situations, "[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation."'" On the other
hand, the comment to Model Rule 1.2 provides that though the lawyer
must consult with the client as to means, it is the lawyer's responsibility
to select the means used to achieve the client's ends.52 On its face,
Model Rule 1.2 appears to present an easy-to-apply, albeit lawyer-
centered, test. Strategic and tactical decisions are only means and, as
such, are squarely within the lawyer's province. Nonetheless, the
comment to Rule 1.2 recognizes "[a] clear distinction between objectives
and means sometimes cannot be drawn."" Moreover, the lawyer's
selection of means or strategic choices may so profoundly affect the
client's substantive rights and the opportunity to realize the client's
objectives that it is inconsistent with general agency principles to permit
the lawyer/agent such sweeping control.54 Most legal scholars, therefore,
have sharply criticized the ends/means test as vague and unhelpful in
determining whether a client ultimately has the right to make particular
strategic decisions.55
Other language in the official comments to Model Rules 1.2 and 1.3
only adds to the confusion. The comment to Model Rule 1.2, in fact,
begins by observing that "[b]oth lawyer and client have authority and
responsibility in the objectives and means of representation," then admits
that often "the client-lawyer relationship partakes of a joint undertaking,"
and finally warns that the law defining the scope of a lawyer's "authority
in litigation varies among jurisdictions."56  That same comment also
51. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1989).
52. see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 cmt. (1989).
53. Id.
54. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14 (1958) (giving a principal the right to control
the conduct of an agent); see also id. § 369 (forbidding an agent to act contrary to a principal's
wishes); id. § 385 (giving agent "a duty to obey all reasonable directions in regard to the manner
of performing a service that he has contracted to perform"). As the comment to subsection (1) of
section 385 indicates, although "an attorney is in complete charge of the minutiae of court
proceedings" and may be permitted to withdraw if not allowed to act as counsel thinks best, the
attorney still is under a duty not to act contrary to the directions of the principal. Id. § 385(1) cmt.
a. As that same comment makes clear, however, the agent is under no duty to perform illegal or
unethical acts. See id.
55. See, e.g., BINDER ET AL., supra note 22, at 267-70; Dinerstein, supra note 14, at 535-38;
Maute, supra note 40, at 1080-1105; Miller, supra note 16, at 506-09; Lee A. Pizzimenti, The
Lawyer's Duty to Warn Clients About Limits on Confidentiality, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 441, 473-76
(1990); Strauss, supra note 14, at 318-26.
56. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 cmt. (1989).
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includes the disclaimer that "a lawyer is not required to pursue objectives
or employ means simply because a client may wish that the lawyer do
so.""'  This ability to override a client's objectives cannot be easily
squared with the command of Rule 1.2 itself. It also is difficult to
reconcile Rule 1.2's directive about abiding by the client's decision
regarding objectives with the comment to Model Rule 1.3, which
proclaims that "a lawyer is not bound to press for every advantage that
might be realized for a client."5
The official comments to the Model Rules not only undercut the
client's authority regarding objectives, but also offer inconsistent guidance
on the lawyer's control of the means used in a client's case. The
comment to Model Rule 1.3 notes that a lawyer "has professional
discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be
pursued."59 The comment to Model Rule 1.2, however, cautions that
"[i]n questions of means, the lawyer should assume responsibility for
technical and legal tactical issues, but should defer to the client regarding
such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third
persons who might be adversely affected." 0 Such language hardly
suggests that a lawyer's professional discretion regarding means is
unrestricted. Rather, for the lawyer in our earlier example wrestling with
the decision whether to call the client's elderly father against the client's
wishes, the comment to Rule 1.2 arguably directs counsel to defer to her
client's choice because that choice reflects the client's concern for his
father's well-being. On the other hand, the vagueness of the ends/means
test and the inconsistencies in the Model Rules and its official comments
leave the lawyer basically free to decide this question as she sees fit.6'
57. Id.
58. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. (1989).
59. Id.
60. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 cmt. (1989).
61. See Dinerstein, supra note 14, at 537-38. A criminal defense lawyer's freedom is, of
course, limited if the courts in her state have taken a specific position on the question of whose
decision controls regarding witnesses. Absent such a controlling decision in herjurisdiction, counsel
can find authority supporting either position she takes. Compare State v. Lee, 689 P.2d 153, 157-60
(Ariz. 1984) (in banc) (holding that by succumbing to client's demand to call two witnesses, counsel
rendered ineffective assistance because strategic decision regarding selection of witnesses belongs to
counsel), State v. Davis, 506 A.2d 86, 92 (Conn. 1986) (holding that counsel's refusal to accede to
defendant's desire to call a witness does not violate defendant's right to be heard or right to
compulsory process), Reddin v. State, 476 S.E.2d 882, 885-86 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that
ultimate decision on witnesses to call rests with counsel), State v. Pratts, 366 A.2d 1327, 1333 (N.J.
1975) (stating that the lawyer has the authority to manage the case and select the witnesses to be
called), affid, 365 A.2d 928 (1976) (per curiam), STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-5.2
commentary at 201 (3d ed. 1993) (stating that decision to call witnesses is for the lawyer), and
Stretton, supra note 23, at 26 (stating it is lawyer's decision regarding witnesses to be called), with
Burton v. State, 651 So. 2d 641, 656 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (stating that the ultimate decision on
1998]
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IV. THE DIVISION OF DECISIONMAKING RESPONSIBILITY IN CRIMINAL
CASES
A. Constitutional Mandates and the Supreme Court's View of
Decisionmaking Authority in the Lawyer-Defendant Relationship
Unquestionably, the profession's ethical rules give lawyers substantial
discretion to select the lawyering orientation they deem proper. Yet, the
criminal defense practitioner also must look to constitutional mandates,
especially case law interpreting the Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel, to determine if the United States Constitution
commands any particular allocation of decisionmaking power between
counsel and criminal defendant. 2 What one finds is that, except for a
few specified decisions ultimately reserved for the defendant,63 the Con-
stitution actually dictates very little about the allocation of
decisionmaking authority between lawyer and defendant."'
A criminal defendant remains free, of course, simply to reject counsel's
aid. The mere fact that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution guarantee the assistance of counsel does not mean that a
state may constitutionally force a lawyer upon a criminal defendant.
Rather, the United States Supreme Court in Faretta v. California65
recognized that the Sixth Amendment grants to every accused the right
to self-representation-the right to conduct one's own defense-because
ultimately it is the defendant who will suffer the consequences if the
defense is unsuccessful. 6 Responding to the argument that a criminal
defendant would be better served by proceeding with counsel's guidance,
Justice Stewart trumpeted the value of individual autonomy.67 Stewart
insisted that the defendant should be free to decline to take advantage of
calling witnesses is for client), People v. Wilkinson, 474 S.E.2d 375, 381-82 (N.C. 1996) (stating that
the decision regarding witnesses to call is the lawyer's after consultation with client, except that if
there is an impasse over the decision, the client has the ultimate say), MONROE H. FREEDMAN,
UNDERSTANDING LAWYERs' ETHIcs 57-64 (1990) (stating that it is the client's right to decide which
witnesses to be called), and Spiegel, supra note 16, at 124 (stating that it is the client's decision
whether a particular witness is to be called).
62. In a state criminal case, a criminal defense lawyer also must ensure that the state
constitution of that jurisdiction has not been interpreted to grant special decisionmaking authority to
a criminal defendant.
63. See generally Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983) (explaining that the defendant only
makes certain fundamental decisions including whether to plead guilty, waive a jury trial, testify in
his or her own behalf, or take an appeal). The Constitution does not however, preclude a lawyer
from sharing decisionmaking power with a client.
64. See id. at 755 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
65. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
66. See id. at 819-21.
67. See id. 832-34.
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counsel's training and expertise and should be allowed to "conduct his
own defense ultimately to his own detriment."6
Not only does Faretta confirm and extol the importance of the
accused's autonomy, it also contains considerable language that encourag-
es a client-centered approach to decisionmaking issues. In the most
significant paragraph in the decision regarding the question of the
division of decisionmaking power, Stewart observed that the "language
and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel ... shall be
an aid to a willing defendant" and that "an assistant, however expert, is
still an assistant.'"" Nevertheless, Stewart went on to acknowledge that
"law and tradition may allocate to the counsel the power to make binding
decisions of trial strategy in many areas. This allocation can only be
justified, however, by the defendant's consent, at the outset, to accept
counsel as his representative."7 Thus, as long as the defendant agreed
to accept defense counsel, Stewart was willing to allow the law-
yer/assistant to bind the client/master at least "in many areas" of trial
strategy.7 Although Stewart did not define with any precision how
decisionmaking power in the lawyer-client relationship is to be divided,
his opinion lends support to proponents of both traditional and client-
centered lawyering.72
Subsequent cases demonstrate, however, that the Constitution gives
defense lawyers wide discretion over decisionmaking issues and requires
only that a represented defendant have final decisionmaking power in a
limited number of fundamental decisions. In Jones v. Barnes,"' the Court
observed that the accused has the ultimate decisionmaking authority over
the following case matters: whether to plead guilty, waive a jury trial,
68. Id. at 834.
69. Id. at 820.
70. Id. at 820-21 (citations omitted).
71. Id. at 820. Consent to accept appointed counsel at the beginning of a relationship, when
the client's only other choice is self-representation, cannot really be characterized as free and
voluntary. Nor is it likely to be an informed choice. For a discussion of the difficulties of forcing
clients to make a decision about the allocation of decisionmaking responsibilities at the onset of the
attorney-client relationship, see Spiegel, supra note 16, at 77-85. Rarely does the indigent defendant
have any say about the choice of his attorney or her lawyering style. Even the paying defendant,
unless unusually sophisticated, generally lacks the knowledge or time to bargain for decisionmaking
power at the beginning of the relationship. See Berger, supra note 16, at 49-50.
72. For an argument that Faretta requires the legal profession to accept greater control by
defendants over tactical decisionmaking and suggests a framework for joint presentation of the
defense, see Richard H. Chused, Faretta and the Personal Defense: The Role of a Represented
Defendant in Trial Tactics, 65 CAL. L. REv. 636 (1977). Most courts, however, read Faretta to
indicate that "a criminal defendant, having agreed to be represented by counsel, is bound by counsel's
decisions on matters entrusted to counsel." State v. Lee, 689 P.2d 153, 159 (Ariz. 1984) (in banc).
73. 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
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testify on one's behalf, or take an appeal.74 Thus, counsel who usurps
one of these decisions risks offending the Constitution. Furthermore, an
appointed lawyer whose professional judgment is that her client's appeal
has no merit cannot withdraw from that appeal, but must advocate the
client's cause vigorously.75 Beyond these few fundamental decisions,
however, counsel's role is to manage the case and to make all tactical
decisions. As the case manager, defense counsel is not constitutionally
required to press every nonfrivolous argument desired by the defendant.
Rather, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority in Jones, confirmed
that counsel has the ability, and ultimately the power, to present the
client's case in accord with counsel's best professional judgment,
regardless of the client's wishes.76
In his dissent in Jones, Justice Brennan voiced his disagreement with
Burger's view of the proper function or role of defense counsel.77
According to Brennan, the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel includes
a personal right to make the decision of "which nonfrivolous issues
should be presented on appeal," even against the advice of counsel if the
defendant so chooses.7" Clients have the capacity-and lawyers have the
time to assist them-to make informed tactical judgments about their
appeals. Even if a defense lawyer may be better able to make wiser
tactical choices, Brennan contended that the Sixth Amendment obligates
the defense counsel to protect a client's dignity and autonomy.79 Thus,
counsel should be assisting the defendant to make choices, not imposing
choices on the defendant, because "[t]he role of the defense lawyer
should be above all to function as the instrument and defender of the
client's autonomy and dignity in all phases of the criminal process.""0
Brennan's view of lawyering as articulated in Jones is decidedly more
client-centered than that espoused by the majority. His forceful defense
74. See id. at 751.
75. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 742-44 (1967).
76. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 753 n.6. In support of his position, Burger looked to the final draft
of MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Proposed Rule 1.2(a) (Final Draft 1982), which
specified that "the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision ... as to a plea to be entered, whether
to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify." Id. Burger then declared that "[w]ith the
exception of these specified fundamental decisions, an attorney's duty is to take professional
responsibility for the conduct of the case, after consulting with his client." Id.
77. See id. at 755-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan's dissent was joined by Justice
Marshall. See id at 755. In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun also expressed his agreement
with Brennan's ethical view, observing that "it seems to me that the lawyer, after giving his client
his best opinion as to the course most likely to succeed, should acquiesce in the client's choice of
which nonfrivolous claims to pursue." Id. at 754 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 758 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. See id. at 759 (discussing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967)).
80. Id. at 763.
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of the accused's right to make strategic choices, even if detrimental,
extends beyond just fundamental decisions of the defense.8' Nonetheless,
Brennan acknowledged that the allocation of authority between lawyer
and client at trial is subject to significant time constraints.8 2 It is proper,
therefore, to confer decisionmaking authority on the lawyer "with regard
to the hundreds of decisions that must be made quickly in the course of
a trial." 3
Although Brennan's views on the allocation of decisionmaking
responsibility between lawyer and client have received considerable
attention by commentators, 4 his client-centered approach to lawyering
has never been adopted by a majority of the Court. Indeed, during the
next term, the Court in Strickland v. Washington5 established a two-
pronged test for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that
incorporated a strong presumption that defense counsel rendered adequate
assistance and "made all significant decisions in the exercise of reason-
able professional judgment." 6 The Court recognized that counsel, "as
assistant to the defendant," had certain basic duties, including the
"overarching duty to advocate the defendant's cause and the more
particular duties to consult with the defendant on important decisions and
to keep the defendant informed of important developments." 7 The Court,
however, specifically declined to adopt a set of standards or to provide
rules of conduct outlining defense counsel's duties and responsibilities
when representing a criminal defendant.8 The Court worried that such
rules would interfere with counsel's professional independence and the
"wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions."89
81. In Brennan's view, choosing a lawyer should not mean that the defendant relinquishes
control over every aspect of the case except for its most basic structure. See id at 759. Rather, it
means that
[a] defendant's interest in his case clearly extends to other matters. Absent exceptional
circumstances, he is bound by the tactics used by his counsel at trial and on appeal. He
may want to press the argument that he is innocent, even if other stratagems are more
likely to result in the dismissal of charges or in a reduction of punishment. He may want
to insist on certain arguments for political reasons. He may want to protect third parties.
This is just as true on appeal as at trial, and the proper role of counsel is to assist him in
these efforts, insofar as that is possible consistent with the lawyer's conscience, the law,
and his duties to the court.
Id. at 759 (citation omitted).
82. See id. at 760.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 16, at 31-32, 39-40.
85. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
86. Id. at 690.
87. Id. at 688.
88. See id: at 688-89.
89. Id. at 689.
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Surprisingly, the Court in Strickland suggested that "[c]ounsel's actions
are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by
the defendant."9 It is difficult to take this comment seriously in light of
the Court's earlier pronouncement that counsel's duty is limited to
consulting with, and to informing clients about, important decisions, and
the Court's repeated references to the importance of deferring to
counsel's reasonable judgments.9 In fact, the 'opinion states that
counsel's "[s]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law
and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable." 2
Strickland grants defense lawyers almost unlimited freedom of action in
managing a case and further dictates that counsel's strategic choices will
be deemed professionally adequate as long as they can reasonably be
considered sound trial strategy. Although Strickland does not mandate
a lawyer-centered approach to decisionmaking, it certainly facilitates such
an approach. In sum, however, neither the Constitution nor the Supreme
Court provides many definitive answers to the allocation of
decisionmaking questions that lawyers, clients, and courts regularly
confront.
B. Professional Standards and Decisionmaking Responsibility
The most useful statement of the prevailing norms of criminal defense
lawyers can be found in the American Bar Association Standards for
Criminal Justice" (ABA Standards). Though other nationally recognized
standards provide guidance to lawyers striving to fulfill their obligations
to render zealous, effective representation,94 the ABA Standards repre-
sents the most widely cited set of guidelines detailing what a criminal
defense lawyer should do to provide quality representation to a person
accused of a crime. 95 ABA Standard 4-5.2, entitled "Control and
Direction of the Case," spells out a division of decisionmaking responsi-
90. Id. at 691.
91. See id. at 688.
92. Id. at 690.
93. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (3d ed. 1993). The first edition of the Defense
Function Standards was published by the American Bar Association in 1971. The present (third)
edition of the ABA Defense Function Standards was approved by the ABA House of Delegates on
February 3, 1992. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE at xii (3d ed. 1993). The ABA Standards
has been cited with approval in countless decisions and has been generally acknowledged to represent
the "prevailing norms of practice." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
94. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, 1996); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (Proposed Final Draft No.
2, 1998). For another set of well-crafted standards expressly designed to aid criminal defense
lawyers, see PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION (National Legal
Aid and Defender Ass'n 1995).
95. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 (acknowledging the importance of the ABA Standards).
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bility that substantially tracks Model Rule 1.2(a) and the majority opinion
in Jones v. Barnes.96 Standard 4-5.2 provides:
(a) Certain decisions relating to the conduct of the case are ultimately for the
accused and others are ultimately for defense counsel. The decisions which are
to be made by the accused after full consultation with counsel include:
(i) what pleas to enter;
(ii) whether to accept a plea agreement;
(iii) whether to waive jury trial;
(iv) whether to testify in his or her own behalf; and
(v) whether to appeal.
(b) Strategic and tactical decisions should be made by defense counsel after
consultation with the client where feasible and appropriate. Such decisions
include what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination,
what jurors to accept or strike, what trial motions should be made, and what
evidence should be introduced.
(c) If a disagreement on significant matters of tactics or strategy arises
between defense counsel and the client, defense counsel should make a record
of the circumstances, counsel's advice and reasons, and the conclusion reached.
The record should be made in a manner which protects the confidentiality of the
lawyer-client relationship.97
As its commentary indicates, Standard 4-5.2 slightly expands the
fundamental decisions reserved to the defendant by Jones and by Model
Rule 1.2(a) to include specifically the decision to accept or to reject a
proffered plea agreement.98 The settlement decision, however, is so
closely intertwined with the decision regarding the plea to enter that no
one seriously argues that such a decision is the lawyer's.99
ABA Standard 4-5.2 directs the lawyer to give the defendant the
benefit of counsel's careful advice and full experience before the
defendant makes any of these fundamental decisions."° Ultimately,
however, it is the client who has the final say in these decisions because
these decisions are "so crucial to the accused's fate."' ,' Ignoring the fact
that many strategic and tactical decisions are likely to affect the outcome
of the trial and, therefore, are equally crucial to the defendant's fate,
ABA Standard 4-5.2 opts to promote lawyer autonomy by giving ultimate
96. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-5.2 (3d ed. 1993).
97. Id.
98. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-5.2 commentary at 201 (3d ed. 1993).
99. See Keith N. Bystrom, Communicating Plea Offers to the Client, in ETHICAL PROBLEMS
FACING THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER: PRACTICAL ANSWERS TO TOUGH QUESTIONS 84, 89
(Rodney J. Uphoffed., 1995).
100. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-5.2 (3d ed. 1993).
101. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-5.2 commentary at 201 (3d ed. 1993).
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responsibility for all strategic and tactical case decisions to defense
counsel.'02
The full extent of the lawyer's decisionmaking power under ABA
Standard 4-5.2 is evidenced by the fact that defense counsel's duty to
consult about trial strategy and tactics is conditioned upon the lawyer's
judgment that such consultation is "feasible and appropriate."'0 3 Thus,
even in an important decision such as whether to call a particular defense
witness, the lawyer is given the professional discretion to make that
choice without consultation with the defendant if the lawyer feels
consultation is inappropriate or unfeasible. Admittedly, lawyers are
encouraged "ordinarily" to consult with the client before making some
strategic decisions, "especially those involving which witnesses to call.' ' 4
Only in limited instances, however, is a client given any check on the
lawyer's power to make strategic or tactical judgments. 5
The commentary to ABA Standard 4-5.2 recognizes that it is important
for criminal defense lawyers to consult with the accused about the
specific decision concerning the submission of lesser included instructions
to the jury. 6 Nevertheless, the current edition of the ABA Standards
places final responsibility for this critical decision in counsel's hands, not
the client's." 7 The previous edition, however, allocated the decision to
102. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-5.2 commentary at 201-02 (3d ed.
1993).
103. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-5.2 commentary at 201 (3d ed. 1993). In
the history of the third edition of Standard 4-5.2, it is noted that "[t]he language 'where feasible and
appropriate' was added in section (b) to reflect the fact that sometimes consultation is virtually
impossible, e.g., in the middle of cross-examination." STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard
4-5.2 history at 200 (3d ed. 1993). Whatever the drafters' intent, the "feasible and appropriate"
language and similar language in the commentary to other ABA provisions encourages consultation,
but arguably provides too much cover for those lawyers who choose not to consult with their clients.
See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-3.8 commentary at 178 (3d ed. 1993)
(stating that a lawyer is not expected to describe trial or negotiation strategy to the client, but
"ordinarily should consult the client on tactics that might injure or coerce others").
104. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-5.2 commentary at 202 (3d ed. 1993).
105. The lawyer in the example we have been discussing arguably would not be empowered
under the ABA Standards to call the client's elderly father over the client's objection. The
commentary to Standard 4-3.1 states:
In questions of means, the lawyer should assume responsibility for technical and legal,
strategic and tactical issues, such as what witnesses to call .... But defense counsel
should consult with his or her client on these questions where such consultation is feasi-
ble, and counsel should defer to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be
incurred and concern for third persons who might be adversely affected.
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-3.1 commentary at 148 (3d ed. 1993).
106. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-5.2 commentary at 202 (3d ed. 1993).
107. See id.
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the client.' The drafters of the current edition offer no explanation for
shifting control of this significant issue back to the lawyer.
The commentary to Standard 4-5.2 proclaims the advantages of this
lawyer-centered model.' 09  Given the complexity of many of the
defendant's rights, it is, in many instances, futile to expect lawyers to
provide a meaningful explanation to most clients of how to exercise those
rights."' In addition, many decisions have to be made during trial
without adequate time for consultation."' Finally, even when decisions
can be anticipated so that consultation is appropriate, the decisions
ultimately should rest with counsel "[b]ecause these decisions require the
skill, training, and experience of the advocate.""' Put simply, because
the lawyer knows best, the lawyer should have the power to make all
strategic and tactical decisions.
C. State and Lower Federal Courts and the Allocation of
Decisionmaking Issues
State and lower federal courts generally have treated issues involving
the allocation of decisionmaking responsibility between lawyer and client
in the same manner as the Supreme Court in Jones. That is, in reviewing
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, courts have had to decide
whether defense counsel's failure to involve a defendant in making, or
failure to defer to the client's wishes regarding, a particular strategic
decision constitutes deficient or inadequate representation. In the vast
majority of cases, that determination is simple. In view of the limited
rights deemed fundamental and reserved for the client by the Constitu-
tion, courts routinely hold that defense counsel's representation was
constitutionally adequate because counsel exercised reasonable profession-
al judgment when she made the particular strategic or tactical decision at
108. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-5.2 commentary at 68 (2d ed. 1980).
The commentary to Standard 4-5.2 acknowledges:
It is also important in a jury trial for the defense lawyer to consult fully with the accused
about any lesser included offenses the trial court may be willing to submit to the jury.
Indeed, because this decision is so important as well-as so similar to the defendant's
decision about the charges to which to plead, the defendant should be the one to decide
whether to seek submission to the jury of lesser included offenses. For instance, in a
murder prosecution, the defendant, rather than the defense attorney, should determine
whether the court should be asked to submit to the jury the lesser included offense of
manslaughter.
Id.




113. See supra text accompanying notes 62-92.
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issue."' Moreover, the defendant is deemed to be bound by counsel's
strategic and tactical judgment calls even though he may not have been
consulted" 5 or may have disagreed with counsel's strategy." 6 According-
ly, appellate opinions generally promote the traditional lawyer-centered
approach to decisionmaking.
Although state court opinions echo Strickland v. Washington in giving
lawyers almost unchallengeable authority to make strategic and tactical
decisions, these opinions, like Strickland, do not dictate a - specific
decisionmaking orientation. 7 State judges, like their federal counter-
parts, have been quite willing to find that a lawyer has rendered
constitutionally adequate and effective representation even though counsel
permitted her client to make a strategic decision typically made by
counsel." 8 A defendant whose lawyer follows his instructions regarding
a strategic trial decision rarely will be able to complain successfully on
appeal that the lawyer acted unprofessionally in abiding by the client's
wishes."' Indeed, in a growing number of death penalty cases, courts
114. See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d 1425, 1433-36 (3d Cir. 1996); People v.
Ramey, 604 N.E.2d 275, 281 (Il. 1992); State v. Johnson, 714 S.W.2d 752, 766 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986).
115. See, e.g., Lovett v. Foltz, 687 F. Supp. 1126, 1135 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (holding that lawyer's
strategic decision not to call a particular defendant, though made without consulting the defendant,
was not ineffective assistance of counsel); Van Alstine v. State, 426 S.E.2d 360, 363 (Ga. 1993)
(finding that although important for lawyer to consult with defendant about requesting lesser included
instructions, failure to do so did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel because lawyer made
strategic choice that was consistent with defendant's feelings about the case); Johnson, 714 S.W.2d
at 766 (concluding that counsel properly made strategic decision to allow admission of inadmissible
evidence without consulting with defendant because decisions other than fundamental decisions made
during trial are necessarily for lawyer alone without advice from defendant).
116. See, e.g., Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1433-36 (holding that counsel's failure to raise issue of
possible juror misconduct despite defendant's wishes was a strategic choice and thus, not ineffective
assistance of counsel); Ramey, 604 N.E.2d at 281 (finding counsel not ineffective despite presenting
self-defense theory contrary to defendant's wishes).
117. See, e.g., Briones v. State, 848 P.2d 966, 977 (Haw. 1993) ("An informed, tactical decision
will rarely be second-guessed by judicial hindsight.").
118. See, e.g., People v. Galan, 261 Cal. Rptr. 834, 835-37 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding counsel
not ineffective for calling witness who gave damaging testimony because counsel did so at client's
insistence); State v. McDowell, 407 S.E.2d 200, 209-10 (N.C. 1991) (holding defense counsel not
ineffective for deferring to client's wishes whether to pass or strike certain jurors).
119. See, e.g., Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1198 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that counsel's
failure to present mitigating evidence was not ineffective assistance because counsel acquiesced to
defendant's wishes that evidence not be presented); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 817 F.2d 285, 290-93 (5th
Cir. 1987) (concluding that neither counsel's failure to present insanity defense nor to introduce
evidence of defendant's mental problems at sentencing constituted ineffective assistance because
defendant objected to either strategy); Foster v. Strickland, 707 F.2d 1339, 1343-44 (11 th Cir. 1983)
(holding counsel was not ineffective for not pursuing insanity defense because defendant insisted on
a contradictory defense); State v. Rubenstein, 531 N.E.2d 732, 740 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (finding
counsel was not ineffective for waiving cross examination of state witnesses, stipulating to psychiatric
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have been willing to permit clients to make strategic decisions contrary
to those proposed by counsel. 2 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for
example, looked to the defendant's right to control the objectives of
representation to find that the client has the right to direct counsel not to
introduce or to argue mitigating evidence in the penalty phase of a capital
case.' The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals went even further by
holding that the trial court did not interfere with the attorney-client
relationship when the court honored the defendant's request to call two
witnesses at the penalty phase over his lawyer's objection.' Citing Rule
1.2 of the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct, the court declared that
"[a]n attorney can only make recommendations to a client as to how to
conduct his defense; the ultimate decision, however, lies with the
client."'1
2
It is not surprising then that lawyers struggling to determine how best
to provide criminal defendants with quality representation feel free to
decide for themselves whether to share decisionmaking authority with
their clients. Criminal defense lawyers realize that the Constitution does
not mandate that they provide quality representation, only that counsel's
assistance be reasonable given all of the circumstances of the case.
2 4
The fact that the Constitution demands so little of defense counsel,
however, does not mean that defense lawyers are free to ignore profes-
sional standards or to provide deficient representation.2 2 Rather, criminal
report and waiving opening argument pursuant to defendant's instructions); In re Trombly, 627 A.2d
855, 856-57 (Vt. 1993) (insisting that defendant who chose, contrary to lawyer's advice, not to ask
for lesser-included instruction, could not complain that counsel was ineffective for deferring to the
defendant's wishes). But see State v. Lee, 689 P.2d 153, 158-59 (Ariz. 1984) (in banc) (deciding
that defense counsel provided deficient representation when he acquiesced to defendant's demand to
call witnesses whose veracity counsel doubted).
120. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 886, 889-90 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (holding counsel not
ineffective for failing to investigate and to present mitigating evidence due to defendant's directives);
Alvord v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1282, 1288-89 (11 th Cir. 1984) (concluding counsel not ineffective
because defendant refused to permit counsel to assert an insanity defense); State v. Brown, 451
S.E.2d 181, 186-87 (N.C. 1994) (finding trial court acted properly in ordering counsel.to follow
defendant's wishes regarding trial strategy); State v. Buchanan, 410 S.E.2d 832, 835 (N.C. 1991)
(holding that defendant cannot complain because counsel acquiesced to defendant's wishes not to
remove certain jurors that counsel deemed unsuitable); State v. Ali, 407 S.E.2d 183, 188-90 (N.C.
1991) (refusing to hold lawyer ineffective for permitting client to make decision not to peremptorily
challenge a juror that counsel wanted to remove).
121. See Commonwealth v. Sam, 635 A.2d 603, 611-12 (Pa. 1993).
122. Burton v. State, 651 So. 2d 641, 656 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).
123. Id.
124. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-91 (1984).
125. A criminal defense lawyer may survive an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, but still
be subject to discipline or to a malpractice suit for providing inadequate representation. Rarely,
however, is a criminal defense lawyer disciplined or successfully sued in a malpractice action for
providing shoddy representation. See Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 20, at 88 ("[The
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defense lawyers are required to be vigorous and zealous advocates
pursuing their client's interest to the fullest extent permitted by law. 126
Although it may be easy to assume that most lawyers aspire to provide
quality representation and to perform in accordance with the highest
standards of the profession, undoubtedly not all do." 7 Many critics of the
criminal justice system question the zeal and the competence of many
criminal practitioners, especially those representing indigent defendants.12 '
A definitive look at the problems of ineffective assistance of counsel and
the need to develop adequate systems for delivering indigent defense
services is beyond the scope of this Article. 2 9 Nevertheless, even if we
accept the proposition that incompetence and lack of zeal are widespread
systemic problems, commentators still agree that many criminal defense
lawyers do, in fact, work tirelessly to provide their clients excellent
representation. 130 What is not clear is whether those criminal practitioners
who are committed to rendering effective assistance of counsel really act
in accordance with the lawyering model presented by ABA Standard 4-
malpractice suit is virtually a non-existent remedy for the criminal defendant.").
126. The criminal defense lawyer "is obliged not to omit any essential lawful and ethical step
in the defense" and is responsible for "furthering the defendant's interest to the fullest extent that the
law and the applicable standards of professional conduct permit." STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE Standard 4-1.2 commentary at 122-23 (1993).
127. There has been a host of articles in the past thirty years decrying the inadequate
representation provided by many criminal defense lawyers. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 20, at
1179-1210; David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. i, 8-11
(1973); Berger, supra note 16, at 50-55; Blumberg, supra note 20, at 28-31; Michael McConville &
Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense for the Poor in New York City, 15 REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
581 (1986-87).
128. Some critics focus on defense counsel's lack of zeal. See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 20,
at 20; David Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in the Public
Defender Office, 12 SOC. PROBS. 255, 272-73 (1965). Others contend that the inadequate
representation provided by public defenders stems not from a lack of zeal, commitment, or ability,
but from a lack of adequate resources and the burden of excessive caseloads. See, e.g., Richard
Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to
Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 661-63 (1986).
129. For a more extensive exploration of these problems, see generally Berger, supra note 16;
Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 20; Uphoff, Zealous Advocate, supra note 20.
130. Just as the literature abounds with stories of deficient representation, there are countless
examples of defense lawyers providing zealous representation even at great personal expense. See,
e.g., Ogletree, supra note 37, at 1260-89 (describing his struggles to represent his clients in the face
of his sister's murder and touting the zeal of his colleagues at the Public Defender Service in
Washington, D.C.). For a look at other favorable accounts of the representation provided by
particular public defender offices or programs, see NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, INDIGENT
DEFENDERS: GET THE JOB DONE AND DONE WELL (1992); THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, CASE-
LOAD/WORKLOAD STUDY FOR THE STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER OF WISCONSIN, FINAL REPORT (1990);
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AN EXEMPLARY PROJECT: THE D.C. PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICE (1975);
Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21st Century, 58 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 81 (1995).
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5.2, or whether those lawyers behave in a more client-centered manner.
Our study was designed to address that question.
V. AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF THE ALLOCATION OF
DECISIONMAKING AUTHORITY BETWEEN PUBLIC DEFENDERS AND
THEIR CLIENTS
A. Methodology and Data Collection
Systematic data collection regarding client involvement in
decisionmaking is virtually non-existent.' A review of the extant
literature reveals only a few previous field studies that examine issues
associated with lawyer-client decisionmaking, and none that employs a
survey methodology similar to that which we considered using.'
Admittedly, confidentiality, lawyers' attitudes, time constraints, and the
nature of legal work make it difficult to obtain meaningful empirical
evidence."' To minimize the effect of these obstacles and to ensure that
our study reflected the views of a significant number of criminal
practitioners, we opted to use a survey method to gather our data about
lawyer-client decisionmaking. We also decided to aim for a sufficient
number of participants and types of decisions to allow for meaningful
group comparisons and statistical analysis. In our view, this methodology
represented the most useful approach for gathering meaningful data about
131. The authors of three recent studies focusing on client competence and decisionmaking in
criminal cases claim that their studies "are the first in the literature to provide data on such questions
as the amount of time attorneys spend with their clients, defendants' level of involvement in their
cases generally, and defendants' involvement in making key decisions." Norman G. Poythress et al.,
Client Abilities to Assist Counsel and Make Decisions in Criminal Cases: Findings from Three
Studies, 18 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 437, 449 (1994). Although the authors acknowledge that their
sample size was small, involving only one six-person public defender office, they found that the
majority of defendants in their studies had actively participated in the key decisions clearly allocated
to them by law. See id. at 450. For a look at the authors' preliminary study, see Steven K. Hoge
et al., Attorney-Client Decision-Making in Criminal Cases: Client Competence and Participation
as Perceived by Their Attorneys, 10 BEHAV. Sc. & L. 385 (1992).
132. Several authors have looked at attorney-client interactions by observing and interviewing
lawyers working in particular practice settings. See, e.g., KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-
COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATrORNEYS AT WORK 37-67 (1985); Gary Neustadter, When
Lawyer and Client Meet: Observations of Interviewing and Counseling Behavior in the Consumer
Bankruptcy Law Office, 35 BuFF. L. REv. 177 (1986); Austin Sarat & William L. F. Felstiner, Law
and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 L. & SoC'Y REv. 93 (1986). Such works offer
useful insights about the attitudes and practices of certain lawyers, but it is difficult to know if these
small samples of lawyers are, in fact, representative generally of lawyers practicing in their respective
substantive areas.
133. See generally Brenda Danet et al., Obstacles to the Study of Lawyer-Client Interaction: The
Biography of a Failure, 14 L. & SOC'Y REV. 905 (1980) (describing the difficulties of gathering
empirical evidence concerning lawyer-client interactions).
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the client's role in decisionmaking. Anecdotal evidence is notoriously
suspect, and conducting personal interviews of a sufficient number of
lawyers would be prohibitively expensive and time consum-
ing-particularly if one wanted to make meaningful comparisons between
lawyers from different offices and locations. A survey, on the other
hand, would generate sufficient data to allow us to draw some meaningful
and valid generalizations about lawyer-client decisionmaking.'
3 4
We focused exclusively on public defenders in collecting our initial
data. By surveying only a selected number of sizeable public defender
offices, we were able to minimize the number of data collection sites and
to maximize the number of likely respondents from each location."' The
cost of such a focus, however, is that the data collected may not be
representative of the beliefs and practices of criminal defense lawyers in
general. Although most public defenders and private lawyers are held to
the same professional standards, 36 the attitudes and practices of privately
retained lawyers regarding lawyer-client decisionmaking may be
significantly different from those of public defenders.'37 Perhaps
134. We recognize the danger, however, in concluding too much from one's empirical work.
See Stewart Macaulay, Law and the Behavioral Sciences: Is There Any There There?, 6 LAW &
POL'Y 149, 157 (1984).
135. Accordingly, it may be that our results reflect the views of public defenders in larger urban
offices, but do not accurately represent the beliefs and practices of public defenders in smaller offices
or rural areas.
136. See, e.g., Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204-05 (1979); Espinoza v. Rogers, 470 F.2d
1174, 1175 (10th Cir. 1972); Spring v. Constantino, 362 A.2d 871; 878 (Conn. 1975); Reese v.
Danforth, 406 A.2d 735, 739 (Pa. 1979).
137. See generally Roy B. Flemming, Client Games: Defense Attorney Perspectives on Their
Relations with Criminal Clients, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 253 (suggesting that series of
interviews with 155 defense lawyers reveals significant differences in lawyer-client relationships and
subsequent representation when comparing private clients and those defendants represented by public
defenders or court-appointed counsel). Yet, it is difficult to generalize about public defenders
because resources and caseloads-and, in turn, the quality of representation and culture of the
office-vary so dramatically from office to office. Compare, for example, the favorable descriptions
of public defenders provided by Ogletree, supra note 37, and by the NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE
COuRTs, supra note 130, with the unflattering accounts provided by McConville & Mirsky, supra
note 127, and by Trisha Renaud & Ann Woolner, Meet 'em and Plead'em, FULTON CoUNTY DAILY
REP., Oct. 8, 1990, at 1. Not surprisingly, the attitudes and practices of the lawyers working in any
office are going to be influenced by the practices, policies, resources, and culture of that office. For
an interesting account of the many influences affecting the attitudes and behavior of public defenders
in the Cook County, Illinois office, see LISA J. McINYRE, THE PUBLIC DEFENDER (1987).
Similarly, the attitudes and practices of privately retained defense lawyers vary significantly.
Various commentators have described the shoddy and half-hearted representation provided by some
private lawyers who do, in fact, function as double agents. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 20, at
1181-95; Blumberg, supra note 20, at 15-31. On the other hand, there are countless private criminal
defense lawyers who work vigorously to ensure that their clients get the best representation possible.
Time, money, commitment to professional ideals, and prior experiences undoubtedly affect the
pirivate lawyer's beliefs and behavior. For a detailed look at the many systemic and personal factors
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privately retained criminal defense attorneys generally exercise a more
client-centered philosophy than public defenders because private clients
have the ability to hire and fire their lawyers."a Then again, many
defendants can afford only a modest, and often inadequate, retainer.'39
If a serious disagreement with counsel develops, rarely will a defendant
have the means to retain new counsel. Thus, few criminal defendants
really have the economic leverage to demand much attention from or
much control over their lawyers.
Unquestionably, a client-centered approach to lawyering takes more
time than a lawyer-centered approach. Public defenders typically
maintain very heavy caseloads, struggle with limited resources, and often
endure clients who are unhappy because they were unable to choose their
lawyers. 40 Conversely, private attorneys with fewer clients and more
resources may be more apt to adopt a more client-centered approach
because they are able to devote more time to their clients on an individu-
al basis. 4' And yet, many private lawyers are paid an inadequate fee by
clients barely able to scrape together a small retainer. These lawyers
often spend little time with their clients and frequently render terrible
representation. 4 It is highly unlikely that these lawyers will be client-
centered because, to make any money in a case, they must pressure the
client to take a quick plea and do so in a manner that minimizes
counseling and client decisionmaking. Because our limited research
budget did not allow for systematic data collection from private lawyers,
we simply do not know if privately retained defense lawyers would report
similar attitudes and practices regarding client-centered decisionmaking.
that influence the behavior of privately retained lawyers, appointed counsel, and public defenders,
see generally Uphoff, Zealous Advocate, supra note 20.
138. A criminal defendant does not have the right to the appointed lawyer of his or her choice.
See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 224 S.E.2d 174, 179 (N.C. 1976). Indeed, indigent defendants are not
even guaranteed the right to a "meaningful relationship" with appointed counsel. Morris v. Slappy,
461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983). A defendant who selects and pays a private lawyer, on the other hand,
is much more likely to trust and to cooperate with that lawyer. Nevertheless, Roy Flemming
contends that a paradox exists whereby privately retained lawyers can take a more traditional
approach to the lawyer-client relationship because they have their clients' confidence, while public
defenders must adhere to the participatory model to win their mistrustful clients' confidence. See
Flemming, supra note 137, at 274-75.
139. See Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer, supra note 8 at 78-79. For a compelling look
at the interplay between economics and the defendant's rights to zealous representation and to ajury
trial, see Alschuler, supra note 20, at 1179-1204.
140. See Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer, supra note 8, at 80.
141. Indeed, Jonathan Casper attributes the more positive attitude clients have toward private
lawyers as compared t6 public defenders with the increased time spent by private lawyers with their
clients. See JONATHAN CASPER, C~iMINAL COURTS: THE DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE 35 (1978).
142. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 20, at 1179-98; Bazelon, supra note 127, at 8-1l; Uphoff,
The Criminal Defense Lawyer, supra note 8, at 79-86.
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Although we have not addressed this issue in our initial study, future data
collection efforts will seek to determine if, indeed, defense counsel's
status affects the allocation of decisionmaking between counsel and
defendant.
B. Survey Instrument
Considerable time was devoted to crafting an instrument that would
reflect meaningful differences in lawyer-client decisionmaking. We
began by identifying twelve strategic and tactical decisions that repeatedly
confront criminal defense lawyers and their clients. 43  Some of these
decisions-whether to accept a plea agreement, whether to waive a jury
trial, whether the client will testify-unquestionably are the client's call.'44
We anticipated that the responses to the survey would reflect the clear
allocation of these decisions to the client. The other decisions identified
in Tables 2, 3, and 5 represent important pretrial and trial-related strategic
choices that may significantly affect the outcome of a criminal case.
Although these decisions are not constitutionally allocated to either the
client or the lawyer, support can be found, to varying degrees, for giving
the client or the lawyer the final say for each of these decisions. 145
We used two different sets of survey questions to determine the degree
of support for client-centered lawyering. One set of questions asked
whether the public defender agrees (strongly, somewhat) or disagrees
(strongly, somewhat) with the proposition that "a lawyer should secure
the client's consent" before making a particular decision. We termed this
set of questions the "Belief' questions because they reveal the extent to
which the lawyer respondents agree or disagree with securing the client's
consent before making each of the twelve specific strategic or tactical"
decisions.
The second set of questions asked "how often do you secure your
client's consent" (almost always, most of the time, sometimes, never)
143. See infra Tables 2, 3, and 5.
144. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745,751 (1983); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.2 (1989); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-5.2 (3d ed. 1993).
145. Compare Alvord v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1282, 1289 (1 lth Cir. 1984) (stating that counsel
was ethically bound to follow client's choice of defense), State v. Boeglin, 731 P.2d 943, 946-48
(N.M. 1987) (declaring that it is defendant's choice, not counsel's, whether to request lesser included
jury instructions), and State v. Ali, 407 S.E.2d 183, 189 (N.C. 1991) (insisting that when client and
counsel at impasse on decision to exercise peremptory challenge, client's wishes control), with Van
Alstine v. State, 426 S.E.2d 360, 361-63 (Ga. 1993) (indicating that, although counsel should consult
with client in deciding whether to pursue an "all or nothing" defense, the ultimate strategic decision
rests with counsel), People v. Ramey, 604 N.E.2d 275, 281 (III. 1992) (stating that choice of defense
is a matter of trial strategy ultimately left for counsel), and People v. Barrow, 549 N.E.2d 240, 249
(11. 1989) (insisting that it is counsel's decision whether to offer certain evidence or call particular
witnesses).
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before making a particular decision. We termed this set of questions the
"Practice" questions because they attempt to identify the extent to which
lawyers actually secure the client's consent before making the same
twelve strategic or tactical decisions. Using these two response formats
enabled us to compare the attitudes of public defenders toward client-
centered lawyering with their reported practices.'46
In addition to the twelve key decisions noted above, we gathered
demographic data on the respondents. The survey asked the respondents'
gender, age, the school from which they received their law degree and the
year they received it, whether they took a clinical course while in law
school, and the nature and the duration of their work experience. The
survey also Sought information about the people and experiences the
respondents perceived to be most influential in developing their own
views about lawyer-client decisionmaking.
We pre-tested our survey instrument on twenty practicing attorneys in
a public defender office in Oklahoma City, a mid-western capital city
with a population of over 500,000. Like the revised survey, the pre-test
instrument was a self-administered questionnaire. After completing the
pre-test, we discussed the instrument with these twenty public defenders
and modified our survey based on their comments and suggestions.
Given the lack of previous research of this sort, the pre-test proved to be
especially helpful in that it confirmed our anecdotal evidence that
criminal defense lawyers sharply disagree about questions of
decisionmaking authority. Moreover, the discussions we had with this
group of public defenders indicated that we were asking the kinds of
questions that would provide useful insights into criminal defense
lawyers' attitudes and practices regarding lawyer-client decisionmaking.
In Fall 1995 and Spring 1996, we administered the revised survey to
attorneys practicing in public defender offices in Los Angeles County
(Los Angeles, California), Cook County (Chicago, Illinois), Washington,
146. We cannot be sure, of course, if the lawyers in our study accurately reported what they
actually do in practice. See Susan Daicoff, (Oxymoron?) Ethical Decisionmaking by Attorneys: An
Empirical Study, 48 U. FLA. L. REV. 197, 220-22 (1996) (discussing several studies finding that
attorneys' actual behavior may differ from what they report they do). The public defenders we
surveyed, however, did not have any obvious incentive to color their responses about their attitudes
or practices regarding client decisionmaking. Because a lawyer-centered approach is more consistent
with the prevailing norms of the profession, a public defender is not stigmatizing herself or
confessing to engaging in inferior lawyering by reporting that she does not regularly involve her
clients in decisionmaking. Similarly, given the widespread acceptance of the client-centered
approach, a defender is not admitting to substandard lawyering by acknowledging that she shares or
cedes decisionmaking power to her clients. Thus, even if a defender were inclined to shape her
responses to present herself in the best professional light possible, neither approach necessarily
reflects superior lawyering. Moreover, our experiences with public defenders suggest that they are
not inclined to answer questions based on a desire to satisfy the expectations of others.
1998]
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D.C., Cuyahoga County (Cleveland, Ohio), and Memphis (Tennessee). ' 47
Rather than conducting a random sampling, we requested that all
attorneys from each office participate in the survey. Response rates
varied from office to office, ranging from a high of 66.7% of the lawyers
in the Memphis office to a low of 48.7% of the lawyers in the Cuyahoga
County office. We concluded data collection with 699 surveys completed
by public defenders in the offices we targeted. The vast majority of these
surveys are from either the Los Angeles County Public Defender Office
(N=343) or the Cook County Public Defender Office (N=285). Neverthe-
less, we were able to make office-specific comparisons of adherence to
client-centered lawyering and found significant differences from office to
office.
C. Survey Results
Table 1 presents descriptive information about our attorney respon-
dents. Nearly 75% of the respondents are white, with African-Americans
representing just over 11% of the sample. About 40% of the respondents
are women. Roughly 75% of respondents are between thirty and fifty
years of age, and 70% received their J.D. since 1980. About 20%
received their J.D. from a "Top 20" law school. 48 The average length
of time in a respondent's present public defender job is 9.2 years. The
newest defender had been on the job for only 4 months at the time the
survey was completed, while the most experienced respondent had been
a public defender for 39 years.
1. Response Frequencies
As noted above, we identified twelve strategic decisions that every
lawyer who practices criminal law-particularly as a public defend-
er-encounters regularly. Table 2 presents response frequencies to the
items that have been labeled Belief items. The survey items are ranked
according to the percent of respondents that "strongly agreed" with the
survey item. These twelve items provide some evidence of the
respondents' degrees of ideological support for client-centered
decisionmaking.
147. All of the respondents were members of public defender offices providing representation
in state courts, except the Memphis respondents, who were employed by the Office of the Federal
Public Defender for the Middle District of Tennessee.
148. The determination of the "Top 20" law schools was based on the rankings from Law
Schools: The Top 25, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Mar. 20, 1995. Although the rankings are
highly subjective and change yearly, every school on the list generally would be considered a top law
school.
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Table 1: Descriptive Information About the Lawyer Respondents (N=699)
(Totals exclude missing data)
Race:
American Indian 3 (0.5%)
African American 75 (11.4%)
Mexican American 39 (5.9%)
Puerto Rican/Other Hispanic 10 (1.5%)







Under 30 years 74 (11.3%)
30 - 39 years 278 (42.5%)
40 - 49 years 220 (33.7%)
50 - 59 years 74 (11.3%)
Over 60 years 8 (1.2%)
Year Received J.D.:
Before 1970 39 (6.1%)
1970- 1979 149 (23.3%)
1980 - 1989 278 (43.5%)
1990- 1995 173 (27.1%)
Law School Type:
Top 20 Law School 130 (20.2%)
Other Law School 515 (79.8%)
Length of Time as Public Defender:
Average Time 9.2 years
Minimum Time 4 months
Maximum Time 39.0 years
The responses set forth in Table 2 reflect differing levels of commit-
ment to the concept of client-centered decisionmaking. First, it is not
surprising that there are four decisions that most respondents strongly
agreed should involve the client's consent. Those decisions are: (1)
making the decision to waive a jury trial; (2) making a decision regarding
a plea bargain; (3) making the decision whether the client will testify at
trial; and (4) making the decision to waive a preliminary hearing. When
one adds in the "somewhat agree" responses, nearly all respondents
agreed that a lawyer should secure a client's consent before making any
of these four decisions.
1998]
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Table 2: Response Frequencies to the Twelve Belief Items (N=699)
Belief Scale Items Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly
Agree Somewhat Somewhat Disagree
A lawyer should secure
the client's consent before:
Making the decision
to waive a jury trial
Making a decision
regarding a plea bargain
Deciding whether the
client will testify at trial
Making the decision to
waive preliminary hearing
Talking to the D.A. about
a possible plea bargain
Deciding whether to
raise affirmative defense
Deciding whether to request
a lesser included instruction
Making the decision to file
a suppression motion
Deciding which witnesses




of an expert witness





















8.4% 29.3% 34.4% 27.9%





Second, there are three decisions over which the attorney respondents
seem sharply divided. Those decisions are: (1) deciding whether to talk
to the prosecutor about a possible plea bargain; (2) deciding whether to
raise an affirmative defense; and (3) deciding whether to request a lesser
included instruction. When the response categories regarding these three
decisions are collapsed into simple "agree" and "disagree" groupings, the
respondents were almost evenly split over each item.
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Finally, most of the respondents apparently believed that the remaining
five decisions are the responsibility of counsel, and fewer than 10% of
the respondents "strongly agreed" that the lawyer should secure the
client's consent before making these decisions. In fact, a majority of the
lawyers responding to the survey disagreed with the need to secure a
client's consent before: (1) deciding to file a suppression motion; (2)
deciding which defense witnesses to call at trial; or (3) exercising
peremptory challenges at trial. An even greater majority of the respon-
dents believed that the client's consent was unnecessary when making the
decision to request the appointment of an expert witness or the decision
to interview the prosecution's witnesses.
Just as Table 2 provides response frequencies for the Belief items,
Table 3 shows response frequencies for what have been labeled the
Practice items. Using the same set of questions, the respondents were
asked to report how often they secured a client's consent before making
a given decision. Table 3 lists the survey items in the same order as they
appear in Table 2.
The response frequencies to the Practice items set forth in Table 3
roughly divide into three categories that are almost identical in composi-
tion to those generated by the Belief items. Again, the vast majority of
the public defenders responding to the survey claimed they "almost
always" secure their clients' consent before: (1) making the decision to
waive a jury trial; (2) making the decision regarding a plea bargain; (3)
making the decision whether the client will testify; and (4) making the
decision to waive a preliminary hearing. Once again, the respondents
were divided sharply over how often they actually secured their clients'
consent before talking to a district attorney about plea bargaining,
affirmative defenses, or requests for a lesser included instruction. In
addition, almost 47% of the respondents contended that they secured their
clients' consent before deciding which defense witnesses to call at trial.
For each of those four items, then, anywhere from 40-60% of the
attorneys claimed to secure the client's consent either "almost always" or
"most of the time" before making the particular decision.
Finally, except for the decision regarding calling defense witnesses, the
practices of the lawyers as reflected by the responses to the remaining
items identified in Table 3 correspond to the beliefs expressed as set forth
in Table 2. That is, in making the decision to file a suppression motion,
to exercise peremptory challenges, to request the appointment of an
expert witness, and to interview the prosecution's witnesses, a majority
of the respondents stated that they obtain their clients' consent only
"sometimes" or "rarely" before making such decisions.
1998]
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Table 3: Response Frequencies to the Twelve Practice Items (N-699)
Practice Scale Items Almost Most of
Always the Time Sometimes Rarely
How often do you secure
your client's consent before:
Making the decision to 96.9% 1.2% 0.4% 1.5%
waive a jury trial
Making a decision 95.2% 2.9% 1.2% 0.7%
regarding a plea bargain
Deciding whether the 93.8% 3.2% 1.5% 1.6%
client will testify at trial
Making the decision to 83.1% 6.0% 4.0% 6.9%
waive preliminary hearing
Talking to the D.A. about 24.5% 16.4% 22.9% 36.1%
a possible plea bargain
Deciding whether to raise 34.3% 26.4% 20.4% 19.0%
affirmative defense
Deciding whether to request 29.6% 21.4% 26.8% 22.1%
a lesser included instruction
Making the decision to file 9.9% 19.4% 26.6% 44.1%
a suppression motion
Deciding which witnesses 16.0% 30.9% 33.0% 20.1%
to call at trial
Exercising peremptory 12.2% 21.5% 35.3% 31.0%
challenges at trial
Requesting the appointment 6.0% 14.4% 29.8% 49.9%
of an expert witness
Making the decision to 2.5% 6.7% 31.1% 59.8%
interview state's witnesses
2. Belief and Practice Scales: Measuring Adherence to
Client-Centered Lawyering
We constructed two indices that seem to capture the respondents'
degree of commitment to a client-centered philosophy. The "Belief"
scale includes the items listed in Table 2 and reflects how strongly the
respondents agree that a lawyer should secure a client's consent before
making particular decisions. The "Practice" scale includes the items
listed in Table 3 and reflects how often the respondents actually secure
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a client's consent before making those same decisions. For both the
Belief scale and- the Practice scale, higher scores mean stronger commit-
ment to the client-centered approach and lower scores mean stronger
commitment to the lawyer-centered approach. Both scales are simple
additive scales with maximum scores of 48 and minimum scores of 12.
The survey also includes an item that we presumed would be strongly
associated with the Belief and Practice scales and that allows us to test
-albeit crudely-for some degree of internal reliability of the survey
instrument. The attorney respondents were asked how strongly they agree
or disagree with the following statement: "A lawyer should allow a
competent client of average intelligence to make all important decisions
regarding that client's case." We assumed that lawyers who agree
strongly with the statement would register the highest Belief and Practice
scale scores, and lawyers who disagree strongly would average the lowest
Belief and Practice scale scores. Table 4 presents average Belief and
Practice scale scores by response category to the above survey item and
indicates that the data supports our predictions.
Table 4: Response Frequencies for Survey Item "Client'* and Mean Differences
in Belief and Practice Scales by Response Categories for "Client"
Survey Item "Client" Response Average** Average
Categories and Frequencies Belief Score Practice Score
Agree Strongly 85 (12.9%) 33.01% 37.16%
Agree Somewhat 165 (25.1%) 30.88% 33.90%
Disagree Somewhat 166 (25.3/) 29.43% 32.64%
Disagree Strongly 241 (36.7/) 27.16% 30.53%
* Client: "A lawyer should allow a competent client of average intelligence to make
all important decisions regarding that client's case."
**T-tests of the differences in mean Belief scores and mean Practice scores by
response categories to the variable "Client" reveal those differences are all significant
at p < .001.149
149. A T-test is used to determine whether a difference between two sample means is so large
that it can no longer be attributed to sampling error. When it can no longer be attributed to sampling
error, the difference in the two means is statistically significant. That is, the difference between the
two means is the result of a real population difference and not just sampling error. Generally, we
can assume a difference between two means reflects a real population difference when the probability
is very small (for example, only 5 chances out of 100, or when p < .05) that the sample difference
is a product of sampling error. It is a matter of convention to use the .05 level of significance, but
significance levels can be set up for any degree of probability. A more stringent significance level,
for example, is the .01 level of significance (p < .01), whereby there is only a I -out-of-100 chance
that the obtained sample difference could occur by sampling error. To take an even more extreme
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Table 4 reflects a distribution of responses that is slightly skewed
toward the disagree categories with 12.9% agreeing strongly, 25.1%
agreeing somewhat, 25.3% disagreeing somewhat, and 36.7% disagreeing
strongly. Table 4 also reveals that responses to this item are strongly
associated with lawyers' average Belief and Practice scale scores in the
direction we predicted. That is, the more a respondent agrees with the
statement, the higher the respondent's average Belief and Practice scale
score. Further, as one moves from the disagree strongly category to the
agree strongly category, the mean score of both Belief and Practice scales
increases in a statistically significant fashion (p < .001). The average
Belief scale score increases from 27.16 to 33.01, and the average Practice
scale score increases from 30.53 to 37.16, with each incremental increase
in the average score being statistically significant compared to the last
one. We interpret the results in Table 4 as additional evidence that our
Belief and Practice scales generate valid and reliable measures of
respondents' degrees of adherence to client-centered decisionmaking.
D. Conclusions
Given the degree of decisionmaking control vested in defense counsel
by the courts, ethical rules, and ABA Standards, we were surprised by the
number of public defenders in this study who advocated a client-centered
approach. As Table 4 reflects, 38% of respondents agreed, at least to
some extent, with the statement that lawyers should allow their clients to
make all important decisions. A closer examination of the responses set
forth in Tables 2, 3, 5, and 6 reveals, however, that the commitment of
our responding lawyers to sharing decisionmaking responsibility with
their clients varies significantly from issue to issue.
In light of the clear authority establishing that certain fundamental
decisions are reserved for the criminal defendant, 5 ' the responses to
questions regarding decisions whether to have the client testify, whether
to waive a jury trial, and whether to accept or to reject a plea bargain are
not surprising. As expected, 97.4% of the respondents agreed that the
client's consent should be secured before deciding to waive a jury trial,'
and 98.1% claimed that they actually secured their clients' consent before
example, setting up a .001 level of significance (p < .001) yields a risk that the difference in means
could be attributed to sampling error only I time out of every 1000. For a further discussion of the
T-test, see JACK LEVIN, ELEMENTARY STATISTICS IN SOCIAL RESEARCH 127-29 (2d ed. 1977).
150. See supra notes 19, 61-122 and accompanying text. In each of the five jurisdictions we
surveyed, there is a host of cases reiterating that the defendant must personally decide fundamental
matters, such as whether to testify, whether to waive the right to trial by jury, and whether to plead
guilty. See, e.g., In re Horton, 813 P.2d 1335, 1342 (Cal. 1991).
151. See supra Table 2.
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doing so. 52 If counsel and the client disagree, however, about waiving
the jury, we asked our respondents who should ultimately make the final
call. As Table 5 reflects, 96.8% of the respondents concluded that the
client should have the final say on this issue.
Table 5: Response Frequencies for the Twelve
"Who Makes the Call" Items (N-699)
Who should make the call if Lawyer Should Client Should
lawyer and client disagree about: Make Call Make Call
Whether to accept or reject a plea bargain 0.6% 99.4%
Waiving a jury trial 3.2% 96.8%
Whether the client will testify 6.6% 93.4%
Waiving a preliminary hearing 21.8% 78.2%
Initiating a plea bargain discussion 31.4% 68.6%
Whether to request a lesser included instruction 63.0% 37.0%
Raising an affirmative defense 72.7% 27.3%
Filing a suppression motion 82.2% 17.8%
Using peremptory challenges 83.3% 16.7%
Which defense witnesses to call to testify 88.6% 11.4%
Requesting appointment of an expert witness 91.9% 8.1%
Interviewing prosecution witnesses 95.1% 4.9%
Similarly, 97.3% of the public defenders stated that the client's consent
should be secured before making a decision regarding a plea bargain,1
53
while 98.1% reported that they, in fact, obtain such consent. 54  We
anticipated such high percentages because defense counsel clearly is
precluded from pleading a client guilty or forcing a client to trial against
his will.' 5' As expected, then, 99.4% of the respondents indicated that if
152. See supra Table 3.
153. See supra Table 2.
154. See supra Table 3. The results also are consistent with the data generated in three earli-
er-albeit much smaller-studies, which found that public defenders actively involve their clients in
the decision to plead guilty. See Poythress et al., supra note 131, at 442-43.
155. See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1966). Although the ultimate decision regarding
a plea bargain is the client's, counsel is obligated to give the defendant her best professional advice
regarding that decision. See Boria v. Keane, 99 F.3d 492, 496-97 (2d Cir. 1996).
1998]
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there were disagreement about the decision to accept or reject a plea
bargain, the final call would be the client's.
15 6
Although 97% of the respondents also contended that in practice they
secured the client's consent before making the decision whether the client
will testify,' a slightly smaller percentage, 94.4%, believed that such
consent should be secured. 5' Rather surprisingly, only 83% strongly
agreed with this proposition, while 11.4% agreed only somewhat. 5 9
Once again, the vast majority of the respondents, 93.4%, felt that if
counsel and the client were at an impasse, the client should have the
ultimate decision regarding testifying. 61 It is interesting to note,
however, that fewer respondents were willing to respect the client's right
to make this fundamental decision than were willing to support the
client's call regarding the other two fundamental decisions.'
61
More than 88% of the respondents indicated that lawyers should have
the client's consent before deciding whether to waive a preliminary
hearing 62 and 89.1% claimed they generally obtained the client's consent
before making this decision. 63 In all five jurisdictions, the defendant has
a statutory right to a preliminary hearing; therefore, it is not surprising
that many defenders involve the client in this decision. 164  Yet, this
156. See supra Table 5.
157. See supra Table 3.
158. See supra Table 2.
159. See supra Table 2.
160. See supra Table 5.
161. Remarkably, 46 respondents, or 6.6%, admitted that they would make the final call on the
question of whether the defendant would testify. See supra Table 5. It is remarkable not only
because Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983), STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-5.2(a) (3d ed. 1993), and the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1989) all indicate that this strategic decision is the client's, but also because
of repeated judicial pronouncements about the importance of the defendant's personal right to decide
whether to testify. See, e.g., Brown v. Artuz, 124 F.3d 73, 76-78 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 1077 (1998); United States v. Ortiz, 82 F.3d 1066, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1996); People v. Robles,
466 P.2d 710, 716 (Cal. 1970) (en banc). Moreover, these 46 respondents represent a statistically
significant number when compared with the 4 respondents claiming the lawyer should have the final
say over accepting or rejecting a plea bargain and the 22 respondents giving the final call to the
lawyer on the question of jury waiver. Apparently, some public defenders are willing to override
a client's decision even in this most fundamental of decisions if they deem such action necessary to
protect a client. See People v. Harris, 236 Cal. Rptr. 680, 684 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (declaring that
"astute" defense counsel who kept his client off the witness stand in an effort to avoid the death
penalty because the defendant wanted to confess violated the defendant's personal right to testify).
162. See supra Table 2.
163. See supra Table 3.
164. Indeed, 78.2% of the respondents believe that the client should make the final call when
the client and lawyer disagree about whether to waive the preliminary hearing. See supra Table 5.
Nonetheless, some authority exists that allows defense counsel to decide whether to waive a
preliminary hearing as a matter of trial strategy. See People v. Moody, 630 P.2d 74, 77 (Colo. 1981)
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decision is not more significant than deciding whether to file a suppres-
sion motion or whether to exercise a peremptory challenge at trial,
decisions that the respondents to our survey perceived as more lawyer-
centered. A partial explanation may be that the preliminary hearing
waiver generally is made in open court, thereby forcing the lawyer to
discuss the question with the client and allowing the client a better
opportunity to voice an objection should the client disagree with the
lawyer's decision. 1
6
It is interesting that 46.7% of the respondents either strongly agreed or
somewhat agreed that they should secure the client's consent before
talking to the prosecutor about a possible plea bargain' 66 and that 40.9%
claimed they usually obtained such consent. 67  What is especially
interesting is that a significantly higher percentage, 68.6%, stated that if
there were disagreement regarding initiating plea discussions, the client
would be the ultimate decisionmaker. 6" This result is somewhat
unexpected because the current version of ABA Standard 4-6. 1(b) does
not require the client's consent before initiating plea bargaining.
61
Perhaps the willingness of so many public defenders to defer to the
client's wishes on this issue is explained by the fact that earlier editions
of the ABA Standards suggested that "ordinarily" the client's consent
should be secured before engaging in plea discussions with a prosecu-
tor. 70 It may be, however, that many public defenders simply recognize
(en banc); State v. Brendeland, 402 N.W.2d 444, 445 (Iowa 1987).
165. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 859b (West 1985 & Supp. 1998) (requiring defendant to waive
personally his or her right to a preliminary hearing).
166. See supra Table 2.
167. See supra Table 3.
168. See supra Table 5.
169. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-6.1(b) (3d ed. 1993). Unlike earlier
editions, the commentary to the ABA's latest version of Standard 4-6.1(b) states that "[t]he client's
consent ordinarily need not be sought and obtained before any approaches are made, as there will
be occasions when some discussion, perhaps only of a very tentative and preliminary nature, will
occur before an opportunity arises to obtain the defendant's consent." STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE Standard 4-6.1(b) commentary at 205 (3d ed. 1993).
170. In the first edition of the ABA Standards, Standard 6.1(b) observed that "[wihen the lawyer
concludes, on the basis of full investigation and study, that under controlling law and the evidence
a conviction is probable, he should so advise the accused and seek his consent to engage in plea
discussions with the prosecutor, if such appears desirable." STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Standard 6.1(b) (Ist ed. 1971). Standard 6.1(c) of that same edition added that "[o]rdinarily the
lawyer should secure his client's consent before engaging in plea discussions with the prosecutor."
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 6.1(c) (1st ed. 1971). As the commentary to the first
edition of Standard 6.1 made clear, the client's permission was to be secured in advance before
negotiations were initiated because the decision to plea bargain belonged to the client. See
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 6.1(b) commentary (Ist ed. 1971).
The second edition of the ABA Standards dropped Standard 6.1 (c) and modified Standard 6.1 (b)
to read as follows: "A lawyer may engage in plea discussions with the prosecutor, although ordinarily
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that obtaining the client's consent prior to initiating plea bargaining is
likely to make the defendant more receptive to accepting a proposed
settlement.
The respondents were almost evenly divided over the issue of whether
there is a need to secure the client's consent before raising an affirmative
defense. While 54.4% responded that the attorney should secure the
client's consent before deciding to raise an affirmative defense, only
21.8% strongly agreed with this statement.' 7' Over 60% of our respon-
dents claimed that, at least most of the time, they obtain the client's
consent before deciding whether to raise an affirmative defense. 72 Given
the critical nature of this decision, '7 it is not surprising that a majority of
the client's consent to engage in such discussions should be obtained in advance." STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-6.1(b) (2d ed. 1980). The commentary to the second edition echoed
that of the first edition, insisting that "[u]ltimately, the definitive decision whether to engage in plea
discussions is for the client, as is the decision to plead .... [C]ounsel may have an opportunity to
advance the client's interests without making any disclosures concerning the defense. Ordinarily, the
client's consent should be sought and obtained before any approaches are made ...." STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-6.1(b) commentary (2d ed. 1980).
Although the third edition's version of Standard 4-6.1(b) no longer requires defense counsel to
secure the client's consent before contacting the prosecutor, it is still remarkable that 31.4% of our
respondents report a willingness to initiate settlement discussions even over the client's objection.
See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-6.1(b) (3d ed. 1993). Perhaps the public
defenders who are willing to do so feel that the defendant is likely to change his mind about the
merits of a plea bargain. Or perhaps these lawyers believe it is their duty to assess the merits of an
alternative other than trial and, if the prosecution's case is strong, to persuade the client that a plea
bargain is in the client's best interest. Even so, it is problematic to initiate plea bargaining without
the client's permission, and even more so to engage in plea discussions over the client's objection.
The lawyer's decision to seek a plea bargain despite the client's objection is likely to damage an
already fragile attorney-client relationship. It suggests to the defendant that the lawyer wants to
"deal" the case, thereby undermining the client's confidence in his lawyer. For a further discussion
of the wisdom of securing the client's permission before plea bargaining, see Uphoff, The Criminal
Defense Lawyer, supra note 8, at 95-98.
171. See supra Table 2.
172. See supra Table 3.
173. The choice of what the defense presents at trial is often inextricably tied to the defendant's
decision whether to testify. In addition, the decision to raise a particular defense, such as an insanity
defense, may have significant consequences for the defendant even if the defense is successful.
Arguably, because the choice of raising or rejecting a particular defense is sufficiently fundamental,
it should be the defendant's choice, not counsel's. In Foster v. Strickland, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit looked to EC 7-7 of the Model Code to hold that defense counsel
was ethically bound to follow the client's wishes not to present an insanity defense. See 707 F.2d
1339, 1343 & n.3 (11th Cir. 1983). Since Foster, a number of federal courts have recognized that
defense counsel is obligated to present the defense demanded by the defendant See, e.g., Felde v.
Blackburn, 795 F.2d 400, 402 (5th Cir. 1986); Autry v. McKaskle, 727 F.2d 358, 362-63 (5th Cir.
1984); Alvord v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1282, 1289 (11 th Cir. 1984).
State courts have done likewise. "Indeed, where such fundamental rights are involved, there is an
ethical obligation imposed on defense counsel... to advise the defendant of the available defenses
and to abide by the defendant's choice regarding these fundamental decisions." State v. Soares, 916
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the public defenders surveyed involve their clients in such a decision.
What is unexpected is that so many defenders do not, especially in view
of Model Code EC 7-7's use of the example of whether to waive an
affirmative defense as the type of decision that is the client's to make.' 4
What is even more remarkable, in light of the number of respondents
who said they would secure the client's consent regarding affirmative
defenses, is that 72.7% of the responding public defenders believe that if
counsel and client disagree over this issue, the lawyer should have the
final say.'75 Of the five jurisdictions involved in our study, however,
only in Illinois do public defenders find precedent that specifically places
the responsibility of selecting the affirmative defense to present at trial in
counsel's hands. In People v. Ramey, 76 the Illinois Supreme Court held
that the choice of defense theory was a matter of tactics and of trial
strategy that ultimately must be left to counsel.' Given this clear
authority, it is not surprising that 65.4% of the Cook County ?ublic
defenders say that the lawyer ultimately should decide this issue. 
8
Conversely, public defenders in both the District of Columbia and
California are bound by decisions giving the defendant the personal right
to choose whether an insanity defense should be presented. 79  Neither
P.2d 1233, 1257-58 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996); see also Burton v. State, 651 So. 2d 641, 656 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1994) ("An attorney can only make recommendations to a client as to how to conduct his
defense; the ultimate decision, however, lies with the client."); State v. Brown, 451 S.E.2d 181, 186-
87 (N.C. 1994) (stating that trial court acted properly in ordering defense counsel to proceed
according to the defendant's wishes regarding trial strategy, even though counsel felt the tactics
contravened the client's best interests). See generally Lloyd Epstein, Choice of Defense and the
Attorney-Client Relationship: Whose Callls It?, THE CHAMPION, Nov. 1994, at 30 (arguing that the
choice of defense is fundamental and should be the client's call).
174. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. It should be noted, however, that only two of
the five jurisdictions involved in this study, Ohio and Tennessee, follow the Model Code. See OIo
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Anderson 1998); TENN. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY (LEXIS 1998 & Supp. 1998).
175. See supra Table 5.
176. 604 N.E.2d 275 (Ill. 1992).
177. See id. at 281; see also People v. Guest, 655 N.E.2d 873, 879 (Ill. 1995) (holding that
choice of defense theory is ordinarily a matter of trial strategy for counsel to decide); cf People v.
Anderson, 641 N.E.2d 591, 599 (111. App. Ct. 1994) (stating that defense counsel's role as manager
of the case gives counsel the authority to present an insanity defense over the defendant's objection).
178. See infra Table 6.
179. See U.S. v. Marble, 940 F.2d 1543, 1546-47 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (relying onFaretta in holding
that a competent defendant has the right to direct his own defense and make the strategic decision
regarding raising or waiving an insanity defense); People v. Frierson, 705 P.2d 396, 401-06 (Cal.
1985) (holding that defense counsel erred in overriding defendant's express wishes to present a
diminished capacity defense). Although Frierson has been cited repeatedly for the proposition that
counsel cannot make tactical decisions that deprive a defendant of the right to present the only viable
defense, subsequent decisions suggest a defendant does not have the unlimited right to insist upon
any defense. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 811 P.2d 757, 771-72 (Cal. 1991); People v. Burton, 771
1998]
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Table 6: Comparison of Responses for "Who Makes the Call" Items by Office




























jurisdiction expressly provides that the defendant has broad power over
the selection of defenses. Still, given the California case law on the
insanity defense, we anticipated that the Los Angeles public defenders
would be more client-centered on this issue. Yet only 17.3% of the Los
P.2d 1270, 1278-79 (Cal. 1989); People v. Ratliff, 715 P.2d 665, 677-78 (Cal. 1986). Defense
counsel "may be compelled to yield to his client's right to insist on the presentation of a defense of
his own choosing," People v. Ledesma, 729 P.2d 839, 871 (Cal. 1987), but only when an express
conflict arises between counsel and the defendant must the defendant's wishes prevail, see, e.g., In
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Angeles respondents reported that the ultimate call on raising an
affirmative defense should be the client's, compared to 27.3% of all
respondents.8 Even more striking is that 68% of the D.C. public
defenders view this decision as the client's.
The respondents in our survey were almost equally divided on the
decisionmaking issue that the Woodward defense team confronted. That
is, 51.6% of the public defenders answered that the client's consent
should be obtained before making the decision on requesting lesser
included jury instructions,' 8' while 51% claimed to secure that consent in
practice." 2 Just as in the case of the related decision regarding affirma-
tive defenses, however, a significantly smaller percentage of the
respondents, 37%, believe that if the lawyer and client disagree, the client
should make the ultimate call. 3 Although case law also is sharply
divided on this issue, 184 there is considerable authority, including language
in the commentary to the second edition of ABA Standard 4-5.2,' that
squarely places ultimate control for this important decision in the client's
hands. Illinois is the only jurisdiction involved in our study with case
law directly holding that the decision whether to request a lesser included
instruction is for the defendant.8 6  Despite this fact, only 42.7% of the
180. See infra Table 7.
181. See supra Table 2.
182. See supra Table 3.
183. See supra Table 5.
184. Compare People v. Petrovich, 664 N.E.2d 503, 504 (N.Y. 1996) (recognizing the decision
to request lesser included instruction is the defendant's), In re Trombly, 627 A.2d 855, 857 (Vt.
1993) (holding that tactical decision regarding submission of lesser included instruction is for the
defendant), and State v. Boeglin, 731 P.2d 943, 945 (N.M. 1987) (stating that it is defendant's
choice, not counsel's, to request lesser included instructions), with Van Alstine v. State, 426 S.E.2d
360, 363 (Ga. 1993) (noting that decision to request lesser included instruction is matter of trial
strategy involving complex legal considerations and generally in the province of counsel), and People
v. Thompson, 245 N.W.2d 93, 94 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that when counsel and client
disagree over whether to tender a lesser included instruction, the strategic decision must ultimately
be made by counsel).
185. The commentary states:
It is also important in a jury trial for the defense lawyer to consult fully with the accused
about any lesser included offenses the trial court may be willing to submit to the jury.
Indeed, because this decision is so important as well as so similar to the defendant's deci-
sion about the charges to which to plead, the defendant should be the one to decide
whether to seek submission to the jury of lesser included offenses.
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-5.2 commentary at 68 (2d ed. 1980). In the third
edition of the ABA Standards, however, this language has been deleted and replaced with only the
admonition that defense counsel should "consult fully" with the accused about any lesser included
instruction. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-5.2 commentary at 202 (3d ed. 1993).
186. See People v. Brocksmith, 642 N.E.2d 1230, 1232-33 (III. 1994). In Brocksmith, the Illinois
Supreme Court equated the seriousness of the decision to tender a lesser included instruction with
that of the decision of which plea to enter, and concluded, therefore, that the decision should belong
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respondents from Cook County viewed this decision as the client's. I"7
This 42.7% figure, however, is higher than the 37% of all respondents
answering this question who indicated that this decision is the client's,'"8
and is more client-centered than the Cook County response to the related
question concerning affirmative defenses. 9 Nevertheless, the public
defenders from Cleveland were even more client-centered-52.6/---on
this issue, and those from the District of Columbia dramatically more
so-94. 1 %-despite the fact that case law in both jurisdictions suggests
that defense counsel should make this tactical decision.' 90 The Los
Angeles public defenders once again were much less client-centered with
only 29.2% contending that the client should have the final say on this
issue.' 9 Overall, 63% of the respondents were willing to override the
client's wishes on such a decision even though such a call, as in the
Woodward case, may mean the difference between life imprisonment and
acquittal.' 92 It is worth noting that this 63% figure nearly mirrors the
62% of the respondents identified in Table 4 as disagreeing with the
general statement about client decisionmaking responsibility.
The respondents to our survey also were sharply divided about the
decision regarding defense witnesses. Only 8.4% strongly agreed that the
defendant's consent should be secured before calling such witnesses.' 93
Almost twice that percentage claimed, however, that in practice, they
almost always secured the client's consent prior to calling defense
witnesses, while 46.9% stated that they did so most of the time.' 94 Thus,
even though ABA Standard 4-5.2(b) gives defense counsel control over
the choice of witnesses, 95 nearly half of the respondents reported they
to the defendant. See id.
187. See supra Table 6.
188. See supra Table 5.
189. As Table 6 reflects, only 34.6% of the Cook County respondents indicated that the client
should make the decision regarding raising an affirmative defense.
190. See supra Table 6. Although the appellate courts in Ohio and the District of Columbia have
not ruled on the specific issue of the allocation of control as between counsel and client regarding
the lesser included instruction decision, each jurisdiction has case law suggesting that such a decision
is a matter of trial tactics for counsel to make. See, e.g., Bostick v. United States, 605 A.2d 916,
920 (D.C. 1992); State v. Guffy, No. 13167, 1993 WL 169115, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 16, 1993);
State v. Clayton, 402 N.E.2d 1189, 1191 (Ohio 1980).
191. See supra Table 6; see also People v. Cooper, 809 P.2d 865, 897 (Cal. 1991) (stating that
it is unnecessary to secure the defendant's personal waiver of a lesser included instruction when
defense counsel makes the strategic choice to pursue an all-or-nothing strategy).
192. See supra Table 5.
193. See supra Table 2.
194. See supra Table 3.
195. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-5.2(b) (3d ed. 1993).
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obtained their client's consent when selecting the witnesses to call at
trial. 6 Yet, when asked whose decision controlled if counsel and client
disagreed about calling a witness, 88.6% of the public defenders claimed
the final decision was the lawyer's, 197 a position that is consistent with
most case law on this question. 9
In a series of cases, Illinois appellate courts have confirmed that the
decision to call certain witnesses is a strategic one ultimately reserved for
trial counsel.' 99 Similarly, in California2 .. and Ohio,2"' defense counsel
explicitly is empowered to make the decision regarding the selection of
witnesses. If defense counsel opts to defer to the defendant's wishes
regarding calling a witness, however, the defendant will not-at least not
in California-be able to complain that counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by following the defendant's instructions even though counsel
felt that calling the witness was strategically unwise.20 2 Nevertheless, it
is still noteworthy that 88.6% of the public defenders were willing to
override the defendant's wishes on this issue,20 3 especially in light of the
fact that well-respected criminal defense experts, including Monroe
Freedman, argue that the defendant should have the final say on the
selection of witnesses.20 4 Only in the District of Columbia, and, to a
196. See also PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES,* supra note 94, at 94 n.I1 ("The question of which
witnesses to call ... is for counsel to decide after consulting with the client.").
197. See supra Table 5.
198. See cases cited supra note 61.
199. See People v. Barrow, 549 N.E.2d 240, 249 (111. 1989); People v. Abt, 646 N.E.2d 1341,
1348 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); People v. Anderson, 641 N.E.2d 591, 599 (III. App. Ct. 1994); People v.
Johnson, 581 N.E.2d 118, 124-25 (111. App. Ct. 1991).
200. See In re Horton, 813 P.2d 1335, 1342 (Cal. 1991) (confirming that counsel is "captain of
the ship" and in control over all decisions except those expressly held to be fundamental); People v.
Williams, 471 P.2d 1008, 1015 (Cal. 1970) (stating that counsel has authority to control selection of
witnesses); People v. Turner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 362 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (reiterating that all non-
fundamental tactical and strategic decisions, including the selection of witnesses, are the lawyer's to
control "despite differences of opinion or even open objections from the defendant").
201. See State v. Rubenstein, 531 N.E.2d 732, 740 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) ("The decisions on
what witnesses to call ... and all other strategies or tactical decisions are the province of the lawyer
after consultation with client.").
202. See People v. Gadson, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 219, 224-25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); People v. Galan,
261 Cal. Rptr. 834, 835-36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). But see State v. Lee, 689 P.2d 153, 157-58 (Ariz.
1984) (in banc) (holding that counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by abdicating the
duty to make tactical decisions and acceding to defendant's wishes to call witnesses counsel felt were
detrimental to the case).
203. See supra Table 5.
204. See FREEDMAN, supra note 61, at 54. Freedman's client-centered views are trumpeted
regularly in articles in The Champion, the journal of the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers, and in publications specifically written for criminal defense lawyers. See, e.g., Monroe
Freedman, Whose Case Is It Anyway, THE ADVOCATE, June 1994, at 13, 13-15 (publication of the
Kentucky Department of Public Advocacy reprinting an article by Freedman advocating that the
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lesser extent, in Cleveland, is there substantial support for taking a client-
centered approach on this issue.2"5
Turning next to the decision to file a suppression motion, only 27% of
the respondents indicated that they believed a client's consent was needed
before filing such a motion.2"6 In practice, just 29.3% reported that they
actually secured that consent before filing suppression motions.
20 7
Moreover, 46.3% of the public defenders felt strongly that this decision
was the lawyer's, 2"8  and 44.1% stated that they rarely obtained their
client's consent before filing such a motion.2 9  Because the lawyer's
failure to file such a motion may eliminate the defendant's ability to
complain about the violation of his constitutional rights, and may severely
cripple the defendant's success at trial, it is somewhat surprising that
82.2% of the respondents answered that if counsel and the client clash
over filing a suppression motion, the lawyer should have the final say.210
There is, of course, considerable authority placing control over the
decision to file motions in the hands of trial counsel. 211 Thus, we
anticipated that many lawyers, especially busy public defenders, would
make decisions regarding suppression motions without consulting with or
securing the consent of their clients. Yet, it is rather surprising that so
defendant be permitted to make the decision regarding witnesses).
205. See supra Table 6. As Table 6 reflects, 76.5% of the District of Columbia respondents and
36.8% of those from Cleveland report that the client should make this call compared to 5.4%, 11. 1%,
and 13.4% of the respondents from Los Angeles, Memphis, and Chicago respectively.
206. See supra Table 2.
207. See supra Table 3.
208. See supra Table 2.
209. See supra Table 3.
210. See supra Table 5. If it can be shown on appeal that trial counsel's failure to file a
suppression motion deprived the defendant of a crucial defense, the defendant may be able to
demonstrate that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. See People v. Farley, 153
Cal. Rptr. 695, 704 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). Admittedly, however, the defendant on appeal will have
great difficulty showing that the unfiled motion would have been successful. Cf., e.g., Allen v. Nix,
55 F.3d 414,417 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding that motion not suppress was not likely to succeed); United
States v. Gibson, 55 F.3d 173, 179 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that motion to suppress was without
merit).
211. See, e.g., People v. Ramey, 604 N.E.2d 275, 281 (111. 1992) (concluding that choice of
defense theory and other strategic decisions, such as what trial motions to make, are lawyer's call);
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-5.2(b) (3d ed. 1993) (stating that defense counsel
should make decisions regarding "what trial motions should be made"); PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES
Guideline 5.1, supra note 94, at 63-66 (suggesting factors counsel should consider in making strategic
decision to file pretrial motions). Of our five jurisdictions, only California has a case directly on
point holding that the decision to file a suppression motion is a tactical decision for counsel. See
People v. Turner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 362 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). But see State v. Brown, 451
S.E.2d 181, 186-87 (N.C. 1994) (concluding that although normally tactical decisions such as which
motions to make are attorney's, if impasse between counsel and client, client's wishes must control
(citing State v. Ali, 407 S.E.2d 183, 189 (N.C. 1991))).
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many of our respondents were willing to deny their clients the right to
make a choice regarding pursuing a non-frivolous suppression motion."'
In light of Justice Brennan's and Justice Blackmun's positions in Jones
v. Barnes,"3 one might expect that more defenders would be willing to
defer to the client's wishes on this matter. Perhaps the fear of alienating
judges (who are notoriously hostile to time-consuming motions), the low
rate of success of such motions, a lack of time because of caseload
pressure, and the professional's interest in controlling one's craft all
contribute to our respondents' reluctance to give up decisionmaking
control over this issue.214
Similarly, an overwhelming majority of the respondents in our survey,
83.3%, indicated that if the client and lawyer disagreed over the use of
their peremptory challenges, the lawyer should make the decision. 21 5
Although 33.7% of the public defenders claimed they involved their
clients in this decision at least most of the time,21 6 of the 35.5% who
believed that the client's consent should be obtained, only 4.9% felt
strongly.2 7 Nonetheless, it is significant that so many public defenders
are willing to involve their client in a tactical decision-one that must be
made quickly at trial with little opportunity for meaningful consulta-
tion-when that decision generally is viewed as exclusively the
lawyer's. 2Is Once more, the 35.5% who favor, at least to some degree,
a more client-centered approach on the peremptory challenge question is
212. A lawyer not only has the right, but also the duty to refuse to file a frivolous motion. See
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1989); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (1980).
213. See 463 U.S. 745, 755-64 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 754 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). For a discussion of these opinions, see supra text accompanying notes 76-82.
214. For a more extended discussion of the position that a lawyer should defer to the client's
demand to pursue nonfrivolous pretrial motions, see generally George E. Bisharat, Pursuing a
Questionable Suppression Motion, in ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER:
PRACTICAL ANSWERS TO TOUGH QUESTIONS 63 (Rodney J. Uphoff ed., 1995).
215. See supra Table 5.
216. See supra Table 3.
217. See supra Table 2.
218. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-5.2(b) (3d ed. 1993) (stating that
strategic and tactical decisions to be made by counsel include what jurors to accept or strike);
PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 94, at 100 (recommending thatclient's observation about
jurors is one of the factors counsel should consider when deciding whether to accept or to excuse
potential jurors). In his dissent in Jones v. Barnes, even Justice Brennan suggested that:
[i]n the course of a trial, however, decisions must often be made in a matter of hours, if
not minutes or seconds. From the standpoint of effective administration of justice, the
need to confer decisive authority on the attorney is paramount with regard to the hundreds
of decisions that must be made quickly in the course of a trial.
463 U.S. 745, 760 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see State v. Ali, 407 S.E.2d 183, 189-90
(N.C. 1991) (holding that defense lawyer acted properly in allowing client to control decision
regarding the exercise of a peremptory challenge).
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fairly consistent with the 38% responding in a more client-centered
manner to the general inquiry on decisionmaking.2"9
As to the remaining two questions, our respondents were decidedly
more lawyer-centered. Almost 81% of the public defenders disagreed, at
least somewhat, with the proposition that a client's consent should be
obtained before requesting the appointment of an expert,220 and 79.7%
stated they rarely or only sometimes secured that consent.22' Similarly,
88.9% of the respondents disagreed, at least somewhat, that the client's
consent should be secured before interviewing the prosecution's
witnesses,222 while 90.9% claimed they rarely or only sometimes actually
obtained such consent.223 Moreover, only 4.9% of the responding lawyers
indicated that the client should have the final say if a disagreement arose
over interviewing a prosecution witness, and only 8.1% gave the ultimate
call to the client regarding the appointment of an expert.224
We expected that very few public defenders would claim that they
sought their clients' permission before interviewing prosecution witnesses.
Time constraints, communication difficulties, and counsel's duty to
conduct a prompt investigation 2  frequently demand that defense counsel
proceed to interview witnesses without waiting for the defendant's
consent. What is surprising is that 95.1% of the respondents indicated
that they would override the client's wishes about interviewing a
prospective witness.226 Perhaps many lawyers would feel compelled to
do so because of counsel's obligation to conduct an adequate investiga-
tion of the case even in the face of the defendant's stated desire to plead
219. See supra Table 4.
220. See supra Table 2.
221. See supra Table 3.
222. See supra Table 2.
223. See supra Table 3.
224. See supra Table 5.
* 225. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-4.1 (3d ed. 1993).
226. See supra Table 5. During the early 1980s, Professor Uphoff was the Chief Staff Attorney
of the Milwaukee Office of the Wisconsin State Public Defender. Neither he nor any of the more
than 40 public defenders he worked with routinely sought the client's consent before interviewing
prosecutorial witnesses. Nevertheless, given Professor Uphoff's experiences and other anecdotal
evidence, we expected that more public defenders would defer to a client's express wishes if the
client insisted that certain witnesses not be interviewed.
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guilty.227 Nevertheless, it is striking that so many public defenders would
disregard the defendant's express wishes on such a matter.
Even more striking is that 91.9% of respondents would seek the
appointment of an expert witness even though the client objected.228
Certainly, it may be necessary for counsel to secure a psychiatric expert
despite the client's objection, especially if competency is at issue.
Arguably, however, a defendant's fear that the appointment of a
handwriting or ballistics expert may produce incriminating evidence
should not be disregarded.229  Yet, the vast majority of the public
defenders responding to our survey felt that this is a tactical choice that
ultimately belongs to the lawyer.
VI. FACTORS AFFECTING THE ALLOCATION OF DECISIONMAKING
POWER
As our survey indicates, not only do criminal defense lawyers have
different lawyering styles, but they also have differing attitudes about the
allocation of decisionmaking power between lawyer and client. Although
most of the public defenders in our survey took a traditional view of the
lawyer's role in the decisionmaking process, a significant minority of the
respondents claimed that defendants should be involved in key tactical
and strategic case decisions. The respondents even reported that a
substantial number of defendants actually are participating in important
case decisions.
227. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-4.1 (3d ed. 1993) ("[C]ounsel should
conduct a prompt investigation .... The duty to investigate exists regardless of the 'accused's
admissions or statements to defense counsel of facts constituting guilt or the accused's stated desire
to plead guilty."). The defendant's initial insistence on pursuing a particular defense also does not
diminish counsel's duty to undertake a thorough investigation. See People v. Ledesma, 729 P.2d
839, 871 (Cal. 1987). Although a defendant's wishes not to call certain witnesses may limit the
scope of counsel's duty of investigation, a client's directives do not excuse counsel's failure to
conduct an adequate investigation. See, e.g., Thompson v. Wainwright, 787 F.2d 1447, 1451-52
(11 th Cir. 1986). But see Knight v. Dugger, 863 F.2d 705, 706 (11 th Cir. 1989) (finding that
defense counsel who followed defendant's instructions and failed to interview and to present
defendant's mother did not render ineffective assistance); State v. Ali, 407 S.E.2d 183, 189 (N.C.
1991) (stating that attorney must comply with defendant's instructions regarding tactical decisions).
228. See supra Table 5.
229. It is particularly problematic for defense counsel to obtain an expert over a defendant's
objection when that expert's observations or findings may be subsequently used against the defendant
at trial. See Noggle v. Marshall, 706 F.2d 1408, 1410 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding no Sixth Amendment
violation when prosecutor permitted to call as a rebuttal witness a psychiatrist retained by the defense
to evaluate the defendant, but not called by defense at trial); United States v. Pipkens, 528 F.2d 559,
563 (5th Cir. 1976) (permitting handwriting expert retained by defense counsel but not used at trial,
then subpoenaed over defense objection, to offer incriminating testimony against the defendant); Gray
v. District Court, 884 P.2d 286, 291 (Colo. 1994) (allowing prosecution to access and to use reports
of defense retained psychiatric experts despite fact defense did not intend to call experts at trial).
1998]
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Unquestionably, a lawyer's attitudes and motivations shape that
lawyer's style and manner of representation and, in turn, that lawyer's
behavior.23 ° The different attitudes of the public defenders in our survey
toward client-centered decisionmaking undoubtedly influence the extent
to which those respondents actually involve their clients in critical case
decisions. We recognize that a lawyer's attitudes or orientation regarding
decisionmaking represent only one of many factors affecting the behavior
of criminal defense lawyers and their interactions with their clients.
Certainly there may be a host of reasons why criminal defense lawyers
may chose not to consult with their clients before taking specific action
in any particular case. We were interested, however, in trying to identify
the causal factors that were most likely to reduce or to limit the
defendant's participation in case decisions. Based upon interviews with
the public defenders in our pre-test, existing literature, and our personal
experiences, we isolated eleven different factors that we believed were
most likely to influence a lawyer's willingness to involve a client in
decisionmaking.23' We then asked the public defenders in our survey a
series of questions seeking to determine how often these factors played
an important role in reducing or limiting the client's participation in
important trial decisions. Table 7 reports the attitudes of our respondents.
High caseloads are a harsh reality for every public defender program.232
In the face of this caseload pressure, every public defender struggles to
find the time to do all of the tasks that must be done to adequately serve
the clients.233 Time spent providing a client with sufficient information
so that the client can participate meaningfully and effectively in strategic
and tactical case decisions means less time to devote to investigation,
legal research, or case preparation. Time problems may be exacerbated
230. See Flemming, supra note 137, at 257-75; Ogletree, supra note 37, at 1244-89.
231. We surveyed the following eleven factors: (I) client has low general intelligence; (2) client
has little experience with criminal justice system; (3) attorney's heavy workload; (4) time is of the
essence; decision must be quick; (5) client is less than 21 years of age; (6) client gets bad advice
from other sources; (7) attorney is court-appointed, not retained by client; (8) client may make poor
decisions adversely affecting case; (9) client's suspicion and mistrust of his own attorney; (10) case
involves possibility of death penalty or.extreme penalty; (!1) complexity of issue makes useful
explanation too difficult or time-consuming. See infra Table 7.
232. See Richard Klein, Legal Malpractice, Professional Discipline, and Representation of the
Indigent Defendant, 61 TEMP. L. REv. 1171, 1171-74 (1988).
233. For a look at the extent to which heavy caseloads adversely affect the delivery of indigent
defense services and the measures that public defenders and indigent defense programs take to cope
with caseload pressures, see, for example, RICHARD KLEIN & ROBERT SPANGENBERG, ABA SECTION
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS (1993); Edward C. Monahan & James Clark,
Coping with Excessive Workload, in ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER:
PRACTICAL ANSWERS TO TOUGH QUEsTIONS 318 (Rodney J. Uphoff ed., 1995); Klein, supra note
128; McConville & Mirsky, supra note 127; Ogletree, supra note 37, at 1240; Schulhofer &
Friedman, supra note 20, at 84-85.
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by the fact that so many defendants are incarcerated. Nonetheless,
remarkably few of the responding lawyers answered that their workload
was an important factor in determining a client's participation in trial
decisions. The fact that 74.7% of the respondents believed workload was
rarely a factor is inconsistent with our expectations and the literature.
Table 7: Important Factors Reducing or Limiting Client's
Participation in Important Trial Decisions
Almost Most of
Factor Always the Time Sometimes Rarely
Client has low general 10.7% 18.4% 46.5% 24.4%
intelligence
Client has little experience 3.9% 11.0% 35.0% 50.1%
with criminal justice system
Attorney's heavy workload 2.0% 3.5% 19.8% 74.7%
Time is of the essence; 3.3% 12.6% 47.8% 36.4%
decision must be quick
Client is less than 21 2.0% 3.3% 23.8% 70.8%
years of age
Client gets bad advice from 5.6% 11.4% 41.4% 41.7%
other sources
Attorney is court-appointed, 2.4% 1.6% 5.3% 90.7%
not retained by client
Client may make poor 9.3% 17.8% 44.3% 28.7%
decisions adversely affecting case
Client's suspicion and 3.0% 8.5% 42.7% 45.7%
mistrust of his own attorney
Case involves possibility of 6.8% 5.2% 18.8% 69.2%
death penalty or extreme penalty
Complexity of issue makes 2.3% 3.9% 34.1% 59.7%
useful explanation too difficult
or time-consuming
1998]
HeinOnline  -- 47 U. Kan. L. Rev. 53 1998-1999
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
Echoing Justice Brennan's observations in Jones v. Barnes,234 the
commentary to ABA Standard 4-5.2 justifies placing decisionmaking
power in matters of trial strategy and tactics in counsel's hands, at least
in part, because
[niumerous strategic and tactical decisions must be made in the course of a
criminal trial, many of which are made in circumstances that do not allow
extended, if any, consultation. Every experienced advocate can recall the
disconcerting experience of trying to conduct the examination of a witness or
follow opposing arguments or the judge's charge while the client "plucks at the
attorney's sleeve" offering gratuitous suggestions.
235
We anticipated, therefore, that many of the public defenders surveyed
would identify time pressures and the need for an immediate decision as
a factor limiting client participation in decisionmaking. Indeed, 47.8%
of the defenders noted that, sometimes, it was an important factor. Only
15.9% of the respondents, however, reported that the need to make quick
decisions was almost always or most of the time an important factor in
limiting client-decisionmaking.
Perhaps of greater significance is the fact that only 11.6% of the public
defenders believed that client mistrust was an important factor almost
always or most of the time in reducing or limiting a client's participation
in decisionmaking. Yet, it is generally accepted that indigent defendants
commonly are hostile to, and mistrustful of, the public defender thrust
upon them.236  Perhaps that explains why 42.7% of the defenders
reported that mistrust was sometimes an important factor and only 45.7%
noted that it rarely was an important factor.237
Many public defenders are able to overcome their clients' initial
resentment and are able to forge good working relationships with most
clients. For other defenders, however, client hostility and lack of trust
make it difficult to forge effective attorney-client relationships. Rather
than take the time to allay client suspicion and foster a good relationship,
some public defenders opt simply to minimize client consultation and
participation in decisionmaking. The 11.6% figure does not tell us,
however, if our responding lawyers found their clients generally to be less
mistrustful than reported in the literature, or if they usually were able to
overcome their clients' initial suspicions and establish a good working
234. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
235. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-5.2 commentary at 202 (3d ed. 1993).
236. See, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 761 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); MCINTYRE,
supra note 137, at 62-73; Flemming, supra note 137, at 254-60.
237. It is interesting to note that the responses to the mistrust inquiry reflected in Table 7 are
very similar to the responses regarding the importance of the impact of the client receiving bad
advice from other sources.
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relationship such that mistrust normally was a minimal factor in the
allocation of decisionmaking responsibility.
Not surprisingly, few defenders acknowledged that defense counsel's
status-retained or appointed-was a significant factor affecting their
clients' participation in decisionmaking. In fact, 90.7% answered that
counsel's court-appointed status was rarely a factor. On the other hand,
the client's general low intelligence and a concern that the client would
make a poor, hurtful decision were identified by the highest percentage
of respondents as the two factors that almost always or most of the time
limit the client's participation in decisionmaking. For the public
defenders we surveyed, these factors were more significant in reducing
client decisionmaking than the client's young age or lack of prior
experience with the criminal justice system.
Finally, only 6.2% of the respondents believed that client involvement
was restricted almost always or most of the time because the complexity
of issues made useful explanations too difficult or too time consuming.
Given the language and the commentary to ABA Standard 4-5.2
justifying lawyer-centered decisionmaking in part because of this factor,238
this percentage is rather low. Again, it is unclear whether the respon-
dents are disagreeing with the underlying notion that complexity is a
significant variable or whether they simply believe that this factor
actually has little to do with their individual decision whether to involve
the client in decisionmaking. It may well be that all of the factors we
identified affect, to varying degrees, the extent to which lawyers with a
client-centered orientation actually share decisionmaking power with their
clients. These factors may be of limited relevance to the majority of our
respondents who are ideologically committed to a lawyer-centered
approach and not open to the concept of involving their clients in
strategic or tactical decisions. Additional research should focus on the
extent to which these factors actually affect the willingness of attorneys
to adopt a client-centered orientation.
Though our study is exploratory and examines only public defenders,
we are able to make some comments regarding factors that appear to
generate variation in attorney-client decisionmaking orientation.
Specifically, Tables 8 and 9 evince three sources of variation: (1) gender
of the respondent; (2) the effect of clinical legal education; and (3) the
impact of office culture.
Table 8 shows that for the entire sample, the average Belief scale score
is 29.46 (N=670) and the average Practice scale score is 32.74 (N=642).
Observe that all comparisons of mean scores in Table 8 register a
statistically significant difference except for the gender difference in
238. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-5.2 commentary at 202 (3d ed. 1993).
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Table 8: Mean Belief and Practice Scores by Respondent's Gender,
Experience in Clinical Course, and Office Location
Comparison Average Average
Variable Belief Score Practice Score
Mean Score for 29.46 32.74
All Respondents: (N=670) (N=642)
Gender:
Male (N=386) 29.20* 32.55
Female (N=259) 29.90* 33.08
Clinical Course:
Yes (N=192) 30.17* 33.35**
No (N=442) 29.19** 32.48**
Public Defender Office:
I. Cook County Public Defender 30.98 (285) 33.98 (266)
(Chicago) (N=295)239
2. Public Defender Service 32.67 (15) 36.60 (15)
(Washington, D.C.) (N=17)
3. Cuyahoga County 31.17 (18) 34.67 (18)
(Cleveland) (N=19)
4. Los Angeles County 27.97 (343) 31.40 (334)
(Los Angeles) (N=359)
5. Federal Public Defender 29.44 (9) 35.78 (9)
(Memphis) (N--9)
* Difference in means significant at p < .05 (T-test)
**Difference in means significant at p < .01 (T-test)
average Practice scores.2 40 Regarding gender differences, female public
defenders register a stronger commitment to the ideology of client-
centered lawyering than do males, but this difference seems to disappear
when compared with the respondents reporting of their actual lawyering
239. The number of cases differs depending on whether all of the Belief and Practice scale items
were answered by each respondent. If a respondent did not answer one of the items used to construct
either the Belief or Practice scale, that case was deleted. This is why the number of cases next the
average Belief and Practice scale scores may be less than the total number of cases (N) for that
office.
240. For a discussion of the use of a T-test to measure the significance of statistical differences,
see supra note 149.
[Vol. 47
HeinOnline  -- 47 U. Kan. L. Rev. 56 1998-1999
ATrORNEY-CLIENT DECISIONMAKING
practices.24 Perhaps the demands and constraints of doing the job of
public defending cause female public defenders to behave, in practice,
more like their male counterparts.242 On the other hand, it may be that
women public defenders are more willing to acknowledge the gap
between their beliefs and their practices.
Our study also demonstrates that those public defenders who took a
clinical law course in law school are much more likely to have a client-
centered orientation than those respondents who did not. Specifically,
Table 8 reflects our finding that those public defenders who had a clinical
course in law school are significantly more likely to believe in, and
practice, client-centered decisionmaking. This is not particularly
surprising given the fact that so many clinical law teachers are strong
proponents of the client-centered approach.243
In addition, it is apparent that office culture has an even greater impact
on adherence to client-centered decisionmaking. As Table 9 indicates,
there were significant differences in our respondents average Belief and
Practice scores from office to office. Public defenders from the Public
Defender Service for the District of Columbia registered the highest
Belief and Practice scores while the lawyers from the Los Angeles
County Public Defender's office registered the lowest average scores.244
The average Belief and Practice scores suggest, then, that as a group, the
241. If, as others have suggested, women have a different style of moral reasoning, one that
values contextual factors based on relationships, care, and communication more highly than abstract
factors related to rights, logic, and abstract justice, then it is not surprising that women public
defenders would be more committed to a client-centered approach. For discussions of gender
differences in moral reasoning styles, see generally Sandra Janoff, The Influence of Legal Education
on Moral Reasoning, 76 MINN. L. REV. 193 (1991); Janet Taber et al., Project, Gender, Legal
Education and the Legal Profession: An Empirical Study of Stanford Law Students and Graduates,
40 STAN. L. REv. 1209 (1988).
242. For a look at the pressures on the "empathic" public defender, see Ogletree, supra note 37,
at 1271-81. See generally Abbe Smith, When Ideology and Duty Conflict, in ETHICAL PROBLEMS
FACING THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER: PRACTICAL ANSWERS TO TOUGH QUESTIONS 18 (Rodney
J. Uphoffed., 1995) (discussing the difficulties a feminist public defender encounters balancing her
commitments and her role).
243. BINDER ET AL., supra note 22, Ogletree, supra note 37, Dinerstein, supra note 14, and
Miller, supra note 16, are only a few of the many clinical law teachers who advocate a client-
centered approach to lawyering.
244. Assuming that the office culture at the D.C. Public Defender Service remains as it was when
Charles Ogletree worked there, see supra note 37, and the Cook County Office is similar to that
described by Lisa McIntyre, see supra note 137, one would expect higher Belief and Practices scores
from the D.C. office compared to those registered from Cook County. As Tables 6, 8, and 9 reflect,
the public defenders from the D.C. office are significantly more client-centered than the Cook County
defenders.
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Table 9: Comparison of Average Belief and Practice
Scale Scores by City









































* Difference in means significant at p < .05 (T-test).2 45
**Difference in means significant at p < .01.
Los Angeles County public defenders are less committed to a client-
centered approach to decisionmaking than their counterparts in the other
four public defender offices. Indeed, as the responses to the items in
Table 8 indicate, the District of Columbia public defenders are markedly
more client-centered than the lawyers in any other office, while the Los
Angeles public defenders are decidedly more lawyer-centered. It is
likely that this difference in lawyering orientation is explained, at least in
part, by the aniount of emphasis placed on client-centered decisionmaking
in training sessions and by the lawyering orientation of those lawyers
245. Once again, asterisks mean that there is a statistically significant difference between the
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acting as mentors for newly hired public defenders.246 Undoubtedly, the
prevailing "office culture" of each public defender office also influences
the degree to which our lawyer respondents involve their clients in
important trial decisions.247
Finally, we looked at several other factors to determine if they affected
the respondents' decisionmaking orientation. It has been suggested, for
instance, that younger, less experienced criminal defense lawyers prefer
the traditional approach, but over time, they adopt a more participatory
approach.248 We found, however, no significant association between the
age of the respondent and that respondent's average Belief and Practice
scores. Similarly, we looked at the time that had elapsed since the
respondent had received his or her J.D. and the respondent's average
Belief and Practice scores. Again, we found no statistically significant
correlation. Lastly, we examined the number of months our respondents
were in their present job and found no significant association between the
duration of the respondent's current position and the average Belief and
Practice scores.
VII. CONCLUSION
As this Article demonstrates, many criminal defense lawyers still
believe that as the "captain of the ship . . . 'it is counsel, not defendant,
who is in charge of the case."' 249 Most lawyers also believe that they
generally have the right to control trial tactics and strategy even in the
face of the defendant's contrary opinion or explicit objection. Yet, as our
study shows, a significant minority of criminal defense lawyers are
willing to share decisionmaking power with their clients in a number of
important strategic case decisions. Unquestionably, both the commitment
to, and the practice of, this client-centered approach varies significantly
depending on the strategic or tactical decision to be made. Nonetheless,
not only do a sizeable number of public defenders believe in a client-
246. For a discussion of the importance of the mentor and office supervisors in shaping the
attitudes of the new lawyer, see Ogletree, supra note 37, at 1285-89; Rodney J. Uphoff et al.,
Preparing the New Law Graduate to Practice Law: A View Prom the Trenches, 65 U. CINN. L. REV.
384, 405-07 (1997).
247. Numerous commentators have described the effects of the office culture on the behavior of
those working in a particular office. See, e.g., Ogletree, supra note 37, at 1285-89 (touting the D.C.
Public Defender Service for fostering a culture of winning and for inspiring its lawyers to attain
excellence and to provide the best defense possible). For a detailed account of the culture of an
office quite different from that of the D.C. Public Defender Service, see MCINTYRE, supra note 137,
at 77-94 (describing the Cook County Public Defender Office of the early 1980s).
248. See Flemming, supra note 137, at 275.
249. In re Horton, 813 P.2d 1335, 1342 (Cal. 1991) (quoting People v. Hamilton, 774 P.2d 730,
741 (Cal. 1989)).
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centered approach to decisionmaking, they also claim to practice such
lawyering.
Our survey of public defenders, then, provides the first systematic look
at both the ideological commitment to, and the actual practice of, client-
centered decisionmaking among criminal defense lawyers. Admittedly,
defense counsel's commitment to practicing a client-centered approach to
decisionmaking reveals little about the quality of representation provided
by that lawyer. In our experience, there are excellent criminal defense
lawyers who demand absolute control over all tactical and strategic
decisionmaking just as there are superb lawyers who share
decisionmaking power with their clients in a manner that ensures both
quality representation and maximum client satisfaction. Neither our
survey nor this Article addresses the question of whether those lawyers
taking a client-centered approach actually render better representation to
their clients than those lawyers who follow the traditional approach. That
question surely deserves more attention. In the end, however, no matter
what counsel's orientation is toward decisionmaking, a criminal defendant
will not be well-served unless defense counsel possesses the resources,
skill, and will to provide zealous representation.
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